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GRAYS GHOST
My modest task has been to show, that spendthrift trusts have no
place in the system of the Common Law. But I am no prophet,
and certainly do not mean to deny that they may be in entire
harmony with the Social Code of the next century. Dirt is only
matter out of place; and what is a blot on the escutcheon of the
Common Law may be ajewel in the crown of the Social Republic. 1
As spendthrift trusts gained recognition at the turn of the nineteenth
century, their primary foe, John Chipman Gray,2 acknowledged defeat
without surrendering his objections. Courts and commentators overrode
Professor Gray's concerns without ever addressing them directly.' Now at
the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are faced once again with the
debate as certain states are extending spendthrift trust protection to a
grantor's interest in a trust. Four states-Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and
Rhode Island-now statutorily authorize self-settled spendthrift trusts.4
This dramatic extension of the doctrine raises issues of whether these pro-
tections will, in fact, prove effective and revives many of Professor Gray's
concerns about the place in the U.S. legal system for such trusts.
I. INTRODUCTION
A trust is an arrangement whereby one person (the trustor)5 transfers
property to another person (the trustee) and directs the trustee to hold the
property for the benefit of another person (the beneficiary). 6 Multiple per-
sons may fill each role; for example, there can be several beneficiaries or
co-trustees. One person may play several of these roles; for example, the
trustor may also serve as trustee or may be a beneficiary of the trust. How-
I. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY x (2d ed. 1895).
2. Professor Gray (1839-1915) was on the faculty of Harvard Law School for nearly 40
years and was, at the time of retirement, the Royall Professor of Law, a position he held for 29
years. He continued practicing law while on the faculty, in one instance working on a suit
involving Benjamin Franklin's Will. His published works included: Restraints on the Alienation of
Property (1883, which was also published in a second ed. in 1895); The Rule Against Perpetuilies
(1886), which is recognized as the standard authority on the Rule both in the United States
and Great Britain; and Select Cases and other Authorities on the Law of Property, which was pub-
lished in six volumes from 1888-1892. VII Dictiona7y of American Biography (Fraunces-Grimke)
(A.Johnson & D. Malone eds., 1931).
3. Anne S. Emmanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codfyi the Compromise, 72 NEB. L
REV. 179, 194, 209 (1993).
4. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3571 (Supp.
1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2 to 18-9.2-5 (1999).
As used in this Article, the term "self-settled trust" refers to a trust set up for one's own benefit,
i.e., where the settlor has retained a beneficial interest.
5. A trustor, or settlor, is the person who establishes the trust and transfers his or her
property into the trust. The terms "settlor" and "trustor" are used interchangeably. 1 AUSTIN
W. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 3 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter ScoTr]. The
term "grantor" is also frequently used to describe the person who sets up the trust. BLACK'S
LAW DIcrIONARY 700 (6th ed. 1990).
6. MARK REUTLINGER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS
157 (2d ed. 1998).
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ever, if the same person plays all three roles alone, then no trust is created.7
A self-settled trust is a trust that a person settles, or establishes, for his own
benefit-a trust where the trustor is also a beneficiary. A spendthrift trust is
a trust that includes a provision either prohibiting the beneficiary's credi-
tors from reaching the beneficiary's interest in the trust (an involuntary
transfer) or prohibiting the beneficiary from assigning his or her interest to
a third party (a voluntary restraint).8 A self-settled spendthrift trust is,
therefore, an arrangement where the trustor names herself as a beneficiary
and includes a spendthrift provision that protects the trustor's interest in
the trust from the trustor's creditors.
A hypothetical situation demonstrates why scholars are concerned with
self-settled spendthrift trusts. Imagine a tragic automobile accident in
Washington state caused by a drunk driver, Debra Diversified ("DD"), who
is known for her wild ways but whom police have not previously arrested for
driving while intoxicated. A young single mother, Polly Taft ("PT'), is ren-
dered a quadriplegic. PT sues DD in Washington state court because both
PT and DD are Washington state residents. PT obtains a $15 million judg-
ment against DD, who has minimal insurance coverage but, at thirty-five
years old, is a retired "dot-com" millionaire. When PT tries to enforce her
judgment, however, she discovers that DD has transferred all of those dot-
com millions into a trust with an Alaskan trust company. DD is a beneficiary
of the trust, and the trust pays all of her expenses. The trust contains a
spendthrift clause, which provides that DD's creditors cannot reach the
assets in the trust even though she is a beneficiary. Alaska law, contrary to
the law in most other U.S. jurisdictions, states that such a spendthrift clause
is enforceable. The result seems to be that the paralyzed young mother
cannot enforce her judgment, while DD continues to enjoy her comfortable
lifestyle.
Imagine further that prior to the accident, DD had entered into a
business transaction with one of her former co-workers, Chuck Cash ("CC").
The two of them began a start-up company that grew rapidly and had some
unexpected cash needs early on. They borrowed the needed cash, both
giving the lender personal guarantees and agreeing (pursuant to their
business agreement) that they would each be equally responsible for re-
payment of the loan. The company then failed, and the lender attempted
to enforce the personal guarantees. The lender discovered, however, that
DD had placed all of her assets in the Alaska trust, so it enforced CC's per-
sonal guarantee for the full value of the debt. CC now seeks reimbursement
from DD for her share of the debt, but DD claims she has no funds and that
her interest in the trust is untouchable.
Will this dot-coin millionaire succeed in protecting her millions from
creditors? She is relying on the ultimate enforceability of Alaska's new trust
law. Alaska broke with longstanding legal tradition by promulgating a stat-
7. 2 ScoTr, supra note 5, § 100, at 74.
8. REUTLINGER, supra note 6, at 162.
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ute that allows self-settled spendthrift trusts.9 More recently, Delaware, Ne-
vada, and Rhode Island have followed Alaska's lead.' 0 Generally, while U.S.
courts will allow a trustor to establish a spendthrift trust for the benefit of a
third party, such as the trustor's child, a trustor cannot set up such a trust
for her own benefit." The primary policy reason for this distinction is that
a trustor should be able to set whatever limits she chooses when making a
gift to another, including spendthrift provisions, but should not be able to
place her assets beyond her own creditors' reach, while still retaining use of
those assets.
Certain foreign jurisdictions have no such policy concerns, 12 particu-
larly since the allowance of self-settled spendthrift trusts, together with
other creditor hurdles and tax benefits, is advantageous to the local bank-
ing business. So long as "offshore trusts"13 remained offshore and expen-
sive, their use was primarily limited to extremely wealthy individuals with
specific liability concerns.14 Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island
have also decided to boost their state banking industries by allowing the
self-settled trust to migrate to their shores.' 5 Currently, all four states have
enacted statutes that allow a person to set up an irrevocable trust with a
local trustee, name herself as a beneficiary, and include provisions that
thwart her creditors' attempts to access the trust property. Although com-
mentators have expressed concern about the viability of these trusts, their
reactions have generally been guarded.' 6 One primary reason for the suspi-
cion is that self-settled spendthrift trusts are contrary to longstanding tra-
dition-given form by Professor Scott and the Restatement-that prohibits
such trust.'7
This Article will explore avenues that a creditor might use to attack the
9. ALAsKASTAT. § 34.40.110(d)(1) (Lexis 1998).
10. DEL CODEANN. tit. 12, § 3571 (Supp. 1998); NEv. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (1999);
R.I. GEN. LAWs § 18-9.2-2 (1999).
11. 2AScoTr,supra note 5, § 156.
12. For example, the Cayman Islands, Nevis, Jersey, and the Isle of Man allow self-settled
spendthrift trusts. See Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection and Jurisdiction Selection, 33 U.
MIAMI PHILLIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 14-77 (1999) [hereinafter Osborne, Asset
Protection].
13. The term "offshore trust" is used to describe the asset protection trust, or self-settled
spendthrift trust, allowed in foreign jurisdictions. Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection
Truts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L REv. 11, 12 (1994).
14. However, offshore trusts are increasingly being used by lawsuit-vulnerable profession-
als, such as lawyers and doctors, and the total value of assets now held offshore is estimated to
be between $1 trillion and $6 trillion. Eric Henzy, Offshore and "Other" Shore Asset Protection
Trusts, 32 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L 739, 740 (1999); Debra Baker, Island Castaway, 84 A.BA J.
54 (Oct. 1998).
15. See Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset
Protection Trust Market and the Wealth that Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 831, 857-66
(1999) (addressing the motive behind the changes in the law).
16. See generally Leslie C. Giordani & Duncan E. Osborne, Wil the Alaska Trusts Work?, 3 J.
AssEr PROTECTION 7 (1997); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Recent Wealth Transfer Tax Developments, in
SOPHISTICATED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES 69, 88-90 (A.LI.-A.BA Course of Study Ma-
terials Sept. 1997); Osborne, Asset Protection, supra note 12, at 14-16.
17. See 2A SCOTT, supra note 5, § 156; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 156 (1959).
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onshore self-settled spendthrift trust. The Article assumes that state courts
(other than the courts of Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, or Rhode Island) will
be offended at the notion of a self-settled spendthrift trust, and, therefore,
the creditor will want the enforceability issue to be resolved by a court in a
jurisdiction other than the four identified states. Using a hypothetical, Part
Ill(A) of this Article addresses whether a non-Alaska court (using a Wash-
ington state court as the example) could rule on the enforceability of tort
and contract creditors' judgments against the trust, despite the Alaska
spendthrift provision. Before the court reaches the issue, however, the hy-
pothetical creditors will face jurisdictional and choice of law hurdles, and
full faith and credit problems as to whether Alaska will respect the Wash-
ington court's judgment. There are also other methods of attacking the
trust. As described in Part Ill(B), the creditors could claim that the transfer
to the trust was itself a fraudulent transfer under Washington's fraudulent
transfer statute.18 Part IV sets forth the possibility that the creditors could
attempt to bring the matter before a U.S. bankruptcy court, thus eliminat-
ing most of the jurisdictional difficulties.19 As Part V discusses, the contract
creditor might also claim that the Alaska statute violates the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 0
The Article further addresses, in Part VI, whether the self-settled
spendthrift trusts will serve their secondary goal-federal estate tax savings.
As a general proposition, if the grantor of a trust has relinquished sufficient
control .over the trust assets, then, under federal estate and gift tax princi-
ples, the transfer is a completed gift, subject to gift taxes, and the trust as-
sets will not be included in the grantor's estate for estate tax purposes when
the grantor dies.2' The estate tax advantage to such a trust would be that all
post-transfer appreciation in value of the trust assets would not be subject
to tax. Under the majority rule of self-settled spendthrift trusts, however, a
grantor cannot get those tax benefits with a trust in which he retained an
interest, because that retained interest would make the assets available to
the grantor's creditors, and creditor access is deemed to be equivalent to
continued ownership by the grantor.22 Removing creditor access raises the
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40 (1999).
19. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (describing the national jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts and how a bankruptcy court in one state could rule on an issue affecting a
trust domiciled in another state).
20. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, d. 1.
2 1. The test used has two parts. First, the transfer is tested under gift tax rules to deter-
mine whether the gift is complete, and, when the donor dies, another test is applied to deter-
mine whether the donor retained sufficient control to bring the transferred property back into
the donor's estate and subject it to estate tax. See infra notes 297-2o05 and accompanying text
(discussing the two independent tests of completed gift for gift tax purposes and inclusion in
the estate for estate tax purposes where control or interest has been retained).
22. See Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785, 814 (1986) (stating that retaining
the right to use trust income as security to borrow money subjects the trust income to inclusion
within the gross estate); Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 153, 162 (1981) (holding that when
a grantor's creditors retain the right to reach trust assets, the transfer is rendered incomplete
for gift tax purposes), acq. in result, 1981-2 C.B. 2.
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possibility that the trust grantor could put money in a trust and continue to
live on those trust assets, even while capping his estate's tax liability at the
value of the trust assets at the time he established the trust. Whether the
estate tax liability is limited to the original transfer value depends, in part,
on whether the trust actually prevents creditors from accessing it and, in
part, on whether there are other grounds that the government may use to
nevertheless include the trust assets in the grantor's estate at their full date-
of-death value.
Finally, in Part VII, the Article will address whether the self-settled
trust has any place in the U.S. legal system. The Article discusses this issue
from the historical perspective of the original controversy over spendthrift
trusts, and in light of the current justifications for these trusts. Supporters
of the self-settled spendthrift trust. cite the trend of enormous tort judg-
ments as justification for allowing the introduction of a means to avoid all
personal liability. Supporters also cite the other generous exemptions from
creditor claims legally available, such as unlimited homestead exemptions
in bankruptcy and the protection given to retirement plan and life insur-
ance funds. Supporters inquire, why not allow a debtor to do directly what
she can already do indirectly? These arguments ultimately fail, however.
The other exemptions serve specific social policies and have limitations that
discourage a debtor from placing all of her assets into the exempt form.
The self-settled spendthrift trust, however, allows a debtor to place his en-
tire savings into a trust and avoid all liability without affecting the debtor's
lifestyle. The proposition that these trusts are merely an antidote to a tort
system run amuck also fails because the solution is overbroad and threatens
the entire system of liability, rather than just the abuses within that system.
The Article concludes that the original concerns about self-settled spend-
thrift trusts, and the damage they could do to our system of civil enforce-
ment, far outweigh any potential benefits that they may offer.
II. THE AMERICAN LAW OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND THE RECENT
STATUTORY DEPARTURES
A. THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
A spendthrift trust is a trust that prohibits attachment by creditors
(and sometimes voluntary assignment by the beneficiary) of the benefici-
ary's interest in the trust. U.S. courts began to recognize and enforce
23. A typical spendthrift provision reads as follows:
No interest in any trust estate shall vest in any beneficiary until actual pay-
ment by the Trustee, and no part thereof shall be liable for the debts of any
beneficiary or be subject to the right on the part of any creditor of any
beneficiary to reach the same by any legal proceeding. No beneficiary shall
have any power to dispose of, encumber, or anticipate any portion of said
trust estate.
Spendthrift trusts should be distinguished from discretionary trusts. A discretionary trust is
one in which distributions to the beneficiary are made only at the discretion of the trustee. In
some circumstances, a discretionary trust can provide better creditor protection than a
spendthrift trust with mandatory distribution provisions because the beneficiary cannot force
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spendthrift trusts in the last part of the nineteenth century. In a departure
from the English tradition forbidding restraints on alienation, spendthrift
trusts gained judicial acceptance almost b accident.2 4 Although many
commentators supported spendthrift trusts, 5 Professor Gray was a vocifer-
ous opponent and waged a losing campaign against their acceptance when
they first appeared.2 6 However, despite the scholarly debate, state legisla-
tures and courts overwhelmingly recognized spendthrift provisions as en-
forceable. Currently, all states give spendthrift provisions some degree of
recognition,27 although some states set limitations on enforcement of such
provisions.28
Courts will enforce a spendthrift trust when the beneficiary is someone
other than the settlor. However, the general rule of the Restatement, 29 fol-
the trustee to make discretionary distributions, and a creditor will likewise not be able to force
a distribution. On the other hand, even if the trust has spendthrift provisions, certain credi-
tor, such as child support creditors or taxing authorities, can nevertheless reach the benefici-
ary's interest. That type of creditor can reach all distributions to the beneficiary mandated by
the trust instrument (such as mandatory payments of income or distributions of principal upon
the beneficiary's reaching a certain age). See Bank One Ohio Trust Co. v. United States, 80
F.3d 173, 174-75 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that if a trust converts to discretionary distributions
before a tax lien attaches, then the beneficiary would have no interest subject to attachment);
see also First Northwestern Trust Co. of S.D. v. IRS, 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
a trustee in bankruptcy had no right to trust income in a discretionary trust).
24. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFTTRUSTS §§ 25-33 (1936) (outlining the histori-
cal development of the law of spendthrift trusts in the United States). The acceptance of
spendthrift trusts is primarily attributable to dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Nichols v.
Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), a case that involved a trust that was not a spendthrift trust but con-
verted to a discretionary trust upon the bankrupcty of the beneficiary. GRISWOLD, supra, § 29.
Justice Field nevertheless chose to use the occasion to discuss extensively the validity of the
spendthrift trust. Id. § 29. That dicta was cited by state courts and commentators as law, estab-
lishing the validity of the spendthrift trust. Id. §§ 25-27, 30-3 1.
25. See GRISWOLD, supra note 24, § 30 (analyzing the effects of early commentators' sup-
port of spendthrift trusts).
26. SeeJOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESrRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii-iv (lst ed.
1883) (setting forth Gray's objections).
27. See Emmanuel, supra note 3, at 181 n.14 (noting that an overwhelming majority of
states recognize the validity of spendthrift trusts).
28. For example, most states have statutes that invalidate spendthrift provisions for
claims of child support, and some include spousal support. 2A SCOTr, supra note 5, § 157.
Creditors who have provided necessary goods or services can usually reach assets in a spend-
thrift trust. See id. § 157.2 (explaining how the doctrine of necessities interacts with spendthrift
trusts). Tax claims are another exception. See, e.g., Bank One Ohio Trust Co., 80 F.3d at 176
(holding the spendthrift provision was not effective to prevent federal tax lien from attaching);
United States v. Rye, 550 F.2d 682, 685 (lst Cir. 1977) (same); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 636 F. Supp. 874, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (same). Some states limit the dollar amount of
assets that can be protected under a spendthrift provision. See, e.g., CAL PROB. CODE § 15306
(West 1991) (stating that up to 25% of a spendthrift trust distribution can be reached by bene-
ficiary's judgment creditor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.25 (West 1999) (providing that
income of spendthrift trust in excess of $25,000 is reachable by beneficiary's creditors); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-19(B) (Michie 1999) (limiting the amount sheltered in a spendthrift trust to
$1 million). Georgia and Louisiana statutes allow tort creditors to reach assets held in a
spendthrift trust. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005 (West
1991).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959). This Restatement rule allowing
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lowed in all states except Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island, °
provides that a spendthrift provision will not prevent creditors from
reaching trust assets if the settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary.3 l There
are two primary reasons for this distinction. First, the underlying policy
supporting spendthrift trusts-that the grantor should be able to dictate
the terms of the gift-does not apply to self-settled spendthrift trusts. Sec-
ond, there is strong public policy in preventing individuals from creating• . • 32
an interest in her own property that is exempt from her own creditors.
The source of the general rule is a fifteenth century English statute, which
stated, "All deeds of gift of goods and chattels, made or to be made in trust
to the use of that person or persons that made the same deed or gift, be
void and of none effect." 5 The Restatement describes the rule as follows:
(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a pro-
vision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his in-
terest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support
or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the
maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust
could pay to him or apply for his benefit. 4
Professor Scott has also explained:
It is immaterial that in creating the trust the settlor did not intend
to defraud his creditors. It is immaterial that he was solvent at the
time of creation of the trust. It is against public policy to permit a
man to tie up his own property in such a way that he can still en-
joy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching it.5
U.S. courts have accepted the spendthrift trust as a valid means of
protecting a gift to someone who may face creditor difficulties, but that
acceptance has never been extended to permit a person to place his own
assets beyond the reach of creditors, while still retaining use of those assets.
creditors access to self-settled trusts extends to discretionary trusts as well as spendthrift trusts.
Id.
30. Missouri may also recognize self-settled trusts as enforceable to some degree. Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 456.080 (West 1999); see Marty-Nelson, supra note 13, at 34 n. 113 (describing
Missouri statute).
31. For example, WASH. REV. CODE § 19,36.020 (1999) states: "That all deeds of gift, all
conveyances, and all transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels or things in
action, made in trust for the use of the person making the same, shall be void as against the
existing or subsequent creditors of such person." See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-7705
(1994) (providing an exception similar to Washington's); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-305
(1999) (same).
32. See 2A SCOTT, supra note 5, § 156 (explaining the public policy reasons to prohibit
such trusts).
33. Stat. 3 Hen. 8 ch.4; 2A SCOTt, supra note 5, § 156, at 168 nA.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRuST § 156 (1959).
35. 2A ScoTr, supra note 5, § 156, at 165-68.
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B. ALASKA'S SECTION 110
In 1997, Alaska broke with tradition and created a new type of trust
with the following features: the trust is irrevocable, the grantor may be a
beneficiary, and the assets of the trust cannot be reached by creditors of any
trust beneficiary, including the grantor.36 The Alaska legislation also in-
cluded jurisdictional provisions intended to ensure that Alaska law would
apply when enforcing these trust protections.3 7 It also limited the reach of
the traditional exceptions to spendthrift protection (such as child support
daims).""
Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110 sets forth the trust's characteristics.3s
Former section 110 of the Alaska code provided that creditors of a trustor
could reach assets held for the benefit of the trustor.40 New section 110
provides that if a trust contains a provision restricting access by creditors to
a beneficiary's interest, then such creditors cannot satisfy a daim by from
the beneficiary's interest in the trust, unless:
(1) there was actual intent to defraud creditors;
(2) the trustor has the power to revoke or terminate the trust
without consent of a person who would be adversely affected if the
trust were terminated;
(3) there are any mandatory distributions of principal or income
to the trustor; or
(4) at the time the trust is established, the trustor owes back
child support.
4 1
If any of these four conditions exist, the creditor can reach only that part of
the trust to which the condition applies.
Therefore, under new section 110, the trustor may be a beneficiary of
a trust and receive spendthrift protection for her interest, so long as the
trust is irrevocable and distributions to the trustor are at the complete dis-
cretion of the trustee. If the trustor retains the right to revoke the trust, or
if the trust agreement requires any mandatory payments to the trustor, the
protection against creditors will not be available. Further, the trustor can
neither use a section I10 trust to avoid paying back child support, nor to
36. ALASKASTAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998).
37. Id. § 13.36.310.
38. Id. § 13.36.310(b) (added by the 1998 amendments that are applicable only to trusts
established after September 14, 1998, or registered or reregistered after that date with a
statement in the registration that the act will apply; providing that trust assets reachable only
to extent necessary to satisfy the permitted claim).
39. The Alaska statutory provisions pertaining to self-settled spendthrift trusts are repro-
duced in the Appendix to this Article.
40. Former section 110 read as follows: "A deed of gift, a conveyance or a transfer or
assignment, oral or written, of goods and chattels or things in action made in trust for the
person making the deed, conveyance, transfer, or assignment is void as against creditors,
existing or subsequent, of the person." ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 1962) (repealed
1997). Alaska law prior to the 1997 legislation was, therefore, consistent with the rule of the
Restatement prohibiting self-settled spendthrift trusts.
41. ALAsKASTAT. § 34.40.110(a)-(d) (Lexis 1998).
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intentionally defraud creditors.
Section 110's protection against creditors extends to claims of credi-
tors existing at the time the trustor establishes the trust as well as to the
trustor's future creditors.42 Moreover, there is a short limitations period
applicable to claims against section 110 trusts that come within one of the
four above-listed exceptions. An existing creditor must commence any ac-
tion against the trustor claiming actual intent to defraud within four years
.of establishment of the trust, or one year after discovery of the trust, if
later.45 Future creditors must bring a fraudulent conveyance claim within
four years of establishment of the trust.44 After the trust's fourth anniver-
sary, the statute absolutely protects the trust's assets from claims of these so-
called "future" creditors-or those creditors who postdate the trust's crea-
tion. The Alaska fraudulent conveyance statute, which generally provides
that any transfer made with intent to defraud creditors is void (with no ap-
plicable limitations period), was amended so that it does not apply tQ sec-
tion 110 trusts.
45
Alaska modified its jurisdictional statutes46 in an effort to assure Alaska
court jurisdiction over section 110 trusts and to strengthen Alaska choice of
law provisions contained in the trust instruments. Alaska Statute section
13.36.035(c) provides that an Alaska choice of law provision is "valid, effec-
tive, and conclusive" if all of the following requirements are met: some or
all of the trust assets are in Alaska, one of the trustees is an Alaska resident,
the trustee has the power to maintain trust records and file income tax re-
turns for the trust, and part of the administration of the trust, including
physical maintenance of records, occurs in Alaska.47 The section also pro-
vides that if a trust has a "state jurisdiction provision," 48 then Alaska law
determines the "validity, construction, and administration" of the trust,
including:
(1) capacity of the settlor;
(2) powers, obligations, liabilities, and rights of the trustees, and
the appointment and removal of the trustees; and
(3) existence and extent of powers conferred or retained, includ-
ing a trustee's discretionary powers, the power retained by a
beneficiary of the trust, and the validity of the exercise of a
power.
49
In addition, section 13.36.035(c) now provides that a court can exercise
jurisdiction over a trust with a principal place of business in another state if
42. Id. § 34.40.110(b).
43. Id. § 34.40.110(d)(1).
44. Id. § 34.40.1 10(d)(2).
45. Id. § 34.40.010.
46. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36 (Lexis 1998).
47. Id. § 13.36.035(c).
48. Presumably this phrase is referring to a "provision that the laws of [Alaska] govern the
validity, construction, and administration of the trust and that the trust is subject to the juris-
diction of this state." Id. § 13.36.035(c).
49. Id.
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the trust meets the requirements of section 13.36.035(c) as stated above.50
The Alaska legislature also provided specific protection against attacs
on section 110 trusts. A trust that satisfies the section 13.36.035(c) jurisdic-
tional requirements will withstand a third-party challenge, based on the
third party's personal (including marital) or business relationship with the
settlor, unless the challenge survives the limitations set forth in section
110.51 If there is a claim that comes within the exceptions to section 110
protection (i.e., back child support or actual intent to defraud creditors),
then a court will set aside the trust and enforce the claim against trust assets
only to the extent necessary to satisfy the claim. 52 Claims for administrative
expenses of the trust, including attorneys fees and trustee fees, have prior-
ity over third-party claims, and third-party claimants cannot reach any dis-
tributions made to the trustor or another beneficiary before the com-
mencement of the action to set aside the trust.53
The protections of section 110 do not extend to forced-share claims of
a surviving spouse.54 A section 110 trust is included in the calculation of the
augmented estate for purposes of determining the value of a surviving
spouse's forced share.5 Furthermore, the forced share may be paid out of
the section 110 trust, if assets otherwise passing to the surviving spouse and
assets of the probate estate are inadequate.
C. DELAWARE'S PROVISION
Shortly after Alaska enacted its new trust statute, the Delaware legis-
lature enacted similar legislation.56 The statute defines certain trusts as
"qualified dispositions. 57 To be classified as a qualified disposition, a trust
must:
(1) be an irrevocable spendthrift trust which limits principal
distributions to the trustor to distributions made only at the dis-
cretion of a trustee,
(2) have a trustee who is not a relative or subordinate of the
trustor, and
(3) contain a Delaware choice of law provision.58
The statute appears to allow the trustor to retain a right to mandatory in-
50. Id.
51. ALASKASTAT. § 13.36.310(a) (Lexis 1998).
52. Id. § 13.36.310(b). These provisions mirror provisions in the Delaware statute. See
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3574 (Supp. 1998) (Deleware provision limiting the exceptions).
53. ALAsKA STAT. § 13.36.310(c) (Lexis 1998) (codifying provisions added by 1998
amendments and applicable only to trusts established after September 14, 1998, or registered
or reregistered after that date with a statement in the registration that the act will apply).
54. A forced share, also called an elective share, is the right of a surviving spouse to claim
a statutorily defined percentage of the deceased spouse's estate in lieu of the provisions for the
surviving spouse in the deceased spouse's will. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-203 (amended 1993),
8 U.LA. pt. 11496 (1998).
55. ALASKASTAT. § 13.12.205 (Lexis 1998).
56. DEL CODEANN. tit. 12, § 3571 (Supp. 1998).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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come distributions, 59 a right to discretionary principal and income distri-
butions limited by an ascertainable standard,6°  a right to veto
distributions, 61 and a testamentary limited power of appointment. 62 The
spendthrift provision is effective as to the trustor, and the gift is complete,
so long as the trust meets all of the requirements of the qualified disposi-
tion. However, the assets of the trust are fully subject to claims for child and
spousal support, claims arising out of torts that occurred before establish-
ment of the trus, and daims arising out of fraudulent transfers within the
statutory time limits.
65
D. NEVADA
Nevada and Rhode Island are the most recent converts to the self-
settled spendthrift trust, passing statutes in 1999. Nevada's law extends
spendthrift protection to self-settled trusts so long as they are irrevocable
and all distributions to the settlor are discretionary.6 The statute sets a two-
year statute of limitations for fraudulent conveyance claims concerning
transfers to spendthrift trusts and gives existing creditors six months after
learning of the transfer to file a complaint, if longer.65 The choice of law
rules provide that the Nevada spendthrift provisions apply if at least one
trustee is a Nevada resident or is a bank or trust company that maintains a
Nevada office, and:
(1) any of the trust property is located in Nevada,
(2) the trustor is domiciled in Nevada,
59. See id. § 3570(10)(b)(3) (prohibiting only mandatory principal distributions).
60. Id. § 3570(10)(b)(4). A typical example of such a right of principal distributions might
read as follows: "the trustee shall distribute so much of the principal as the trustee deems
necessary for the beneficiary's health, maintenance, education, and support." This type of
provision is better for the beneficiary than a provision that gives the trustee unrestricted dis-
cretion to make distributions, because under the former provision, the beneficiary may be able
to compel distributions if she can prove she actually needs funds for health, maintenance,
education, and support.
61. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(1) (Supp 1998).
62. Id. tit. 12, § 3570(10)(b)(2). By contrast, the trustor of an Alaska section 110 trust
cannot have a right to any mandatory distributions from the trust. However, it appears that
the Alaska trustor could retain all of the other rights enumerated for Delaware trustors. See
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 1998) (listing the other permissible powers). Of course, if a
Delaware trust required mandatory income distributions to the trustor, those income distribu-
tions would be reachable by his creditors. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3571 (Supp. 1998); see
John E. Sullivan, III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law
Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL J. CORP. L 423, 459 (1998) (exploring the effect of man-
datory distributions and powers in third parties).
63. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3574 (Supp. 1998). The statute originally allowed access to
the trust assets to creditors who were induced to lend by the trustor's representations that the
trust assets would be available to satisfy debt. 71 Del. Laws 159, § 1 (1997), amended by 71 Del.
Laws 254, § 39 (1997). That provision was removed, because it would have allowed the trustor
to gain access to trust assets by lying to a creditor, and' that would have made it an incomplete
gift for tax purposes. See 71 Del. Laws 254, § 36 (1997) (deleting section (2) of DEL CODE.
ANN. tit. 12, § 3573 (Supp. 1998) and renumbering section (3) to section (2)).
64. NEv. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (1999).
65. 1999 Nev. Star. 299, § 1.
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(3) the trustor created the trust in Nevada, or
(4) the local trustee maintains records and prepares tax returns
for the trust and at least part of the trust is administered in Ne-
vada.66
E. RHODE ISLAND
Rhode Island's statute applies to trusts that have a Rhode Island trus-
tee.67 It appears to be modeled after the Delaware statute, describing the
trusts as "qualified dispositions," 68 containing a four-year limitations
period69and exempting claims for existing alimony, child support, spousal
property settlement, and tort claims where the injury occurred before the
trustor created the trust.
0
F. COMPARISON OF THE STATUTES
Although there are variations among the four state statutes, they are
substantially similar. They all require that the trust be irrevocable and that
at least one of the trustees be local. The statutes all prohibit giving the
trustor a right to distributions and require that payments to the beneficiary
be at the discretion of the trustee?'7 The most significant differences lie in
the states' dissimilar definitions of fraudulent conveyance. Alaska requires a
showing of actual intent to defraud for a creditor to be successful in its
challenge to the trust,7 2 whereas Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island all
allow a showing of constructive fraud to prove a trust fraudulent as to
creditors. 73 Another significant difference is Nevada's short limitations pe-
riod, which gives creditors two years, rather than four years, to bring a
claim.74 Nevertheless, all the statutes were designed to accomplish the same
result: validation of the self-settled spendthrift trust.
75
III. STATE COURT CHALLENGES
A. FULL FAITHAND CREDIT CLAUSEANDJURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
One potential threat to the self-settled spendthrift trust is the possibil-
ity that a court in another state will refuse to enforce the Alaska statutory
66. NEv. REV. STAT. § 166.025 (1999).
67. See RI. GEN. LAWs § 18-9.2-2 (1999) (allowing a national bank or other financial
institution to serve as trustee as long as it is qualified to act as a trustee in Rhode Island).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 18-9.2-4(b).
70, Id. §18-9.2-5.
71. However, Delaware's statute appears to allow mandatory -distributions of income. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing exceptions the Delaware statute).
72. ALASKASTAT. §§34.40.010, .II0 (Lexis 1998).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301, 1304, 1305 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 112.180, .190
(1999); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 6-16-4 to -5 (1992).
74. See supra note 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing Nevada's statute).
75. For the sake of simplicity, the Article will refer primarily to the Alaska statute in dis-
cussing hypotheticals and will refer to the other state statutes only where there is a distinction.
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rule7 6 that protects assets from creditor claims and hold that a judgment is
enforceable against such a trust. Offshore trusts generally do not raise this
concern. 77 Returning to the hypothetical, recall that PT (Polly Taft) has
obtained a judgment in a Washington state court against DD (Debra Diver-
sified) for her injuries sustained in the accident caused by DD's intoxicated
driving. Assume that instead of the Alaska trust, DD had placed her assets
in a trust in Nevis, a country in, the Caribbean that allows self-settled
spendthrift trusts. When PT travels to the offshore jurisdiction to enforce
her judgment against DD's trust, she will probably have to relitigate the
issue of liability because the underlying judgment would not be entitled to
full faith and credit,78 and, thus, the foreign (non-U.S.) jurisdiction may not
recognize it.79 Assuming that PT obtains an enforceable judgment against
DD in Nevis, PT would then have to bring an enforcement action in a Nevis
court. In that action, the court would most likely apply Nevis laws, which
allow the spendthrift protection,80 and refuse to enforce its own judgment
against the trust. If PT instead brings the enforcement action in a U.S.
court and obtains a ruling that DD's trust was vulnerable to the judgment,
that ruling would not be entitled to deference in the foreign jurisdiction. In
sum, since offshore trusts are beyond the reach of any U.S. court, trustors
place their assets in offshore trusts because they generally avoid potential
state court hostility towards self-settled spendthrift trusts.
By contrast, an Alaska court is bound by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution.8 ' Therefore,
76. Likewise, a court could ignore Nevada, Rhode Island, or Delaware statutory rules.
77. See Osborne, Asset Protection, supra note 12, 1407.10 (discussing particular concerns
to clients using foreign jurisdictions).
78. The Washington state judgment might be recognized in some foreign jurisdictions,
but one attraction of the offshore trust countries is that their courts are not bound to recognize
U.S. judgments under treaties, statutes or common law principles. See INTERNATIONAL ESTATE
PLANNING 91-96 (Donald D. Kozusko &Jeffiy Schoenblum eds., 1991) (discussing principles
governing enforceability of U.S. judgments in various offshore jurisdictions); Marty-Nelson,
supra note 13, at 59 (discussing practical barriers to enforcement of U.S. judgments in offshore
jurisdictions); Howard D. Rosen & Patricia A. Donley-Rosen, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Do
They Work?, 23 TAX MGMT., EST., GIFrs AND TR. J. 211, 213 n.19 (1998) (noting that Anguilla,
the Cook Islands, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines have legislation that either
exempts their trusts from foreign judgments or provides that foreign judgments are unen-
forceable if based on law inconsistent with their trust laws or if its own law governs matters
related to the judgment).
79. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 13, at 57 (discussing recognition of U.S. judgments in
the offshore jurisdictions).
80. Osborne, Asset Protection, supra note 12, 1407.1 O(F) (noting that Nevis law allows self-
settled spendthrift trusts).
81. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."); U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cI. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
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if PT obtains a judgment in Washington on the underlying liability, and
then brings that judgment to Alaska to enforce it, she need not relitigate
liability issues because the Alaska court must respect the Washington judg-
ment.82 However, even though the Alaska court must acknowledge that the
debtor is liable, it could nonetheless decide that the trust is inaccessible
under state law.83 Therefore, most creditors would want a state court other
than Alaska's (such as Washington in our example) to consider the enforce-
ability issue as well as the underlying liability issue.
Unfortuntately, not every creditor will have this luxury because it is
unclear whether a non-Alaska court will agree that it has jurisdiction over
the enforcement issue.84 Presumably the trust assets will be located in
Alaska, and the court will therefore not be able to claim in rem jurisdiction.
The critical question will then be whether personal jurisdiction over the
trustee is obtainable or necessary.
1. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Trustee
As we shall see, if the trustee of DD's trust had limited activity linked
with Washington, a Washington court will have to determine whether it can
assert jurisdiction over the trustee before the court can order the trustee to
release the trust funds to DD's creditors. The seminal case of Hanson v.
Dencl. 1 8 5 has been cited as an obstacle to enforcement of an out-of-state
judgment against a self-settled spendthrift trust.86 The trust at issue in Han-
son was set up in Delaware by a woman living in Pennsylvania, who then
moved to Florida and later died there.8 7 She had reserved a power of ap-
pointment8 over the trust assets and had exercised that power in writing
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. The Supremacy Clause would be relevant if the order was issued by a federal court, such as
a bankruptcy court. See infra text accompanying notes 184-211 (explaining the potential role
of a bankruptcy court in litigating the validity of self-settled spendthrift trusts).
82. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
83. The Full Faith and Credit Clause would allow this because the Alaska court would he
determining the liability of the trust, which is an Alaska trust subject to Alaska law, rather than
the liability of the debtor who set up the trust.
84. If the court was in a state that had enacted section 7-203 of the Uniform Probate
Code, assertion ofjurisdiction could be sustained. Section 7-203 states that a court can hear a
matter concerning a trust with its principal place of administration in another state "when the
interests of justice otherwise would seriously be impaired." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-203
(amended 1993), 8 U.LA. pt. II 496 (1998). Presumably a court could make that finding
where the courts of the trust's home state, Alaska, were likely to uphold the enforceability of
the spendthrift provisions. See John Paul Parks, Evaluating the Alaska Trust's Ability to Shield
Assets fom the Claims of Creditors, ARIZ. ATr'v, Nov. 1998, at 28, 29 (discussing application of §
7.203).
85. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
86. See Richard Nenno, Delaware Law Offers Asset Protection and Estate Planning Benefits, 26
EST. PLAN. 3, 11 (1999) (noting that Hanson's holding "suggests that a Delaware Court would
not be required to honor a judgment against a settlor in a state that did not have legislation
comparable to the Delaware Act").
87. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238-39.
88. A power of appointment generally is the right to choose who will receive certain
property. A general power of appointment allows the holder of the power to appoint the
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during her lifetime.8 9 The Hanson Court held that a Florida court could not
rule on the validity of the trustor's exercise of the power of appointment,
because Florida law provided that the trustee was an indispensable party,
and that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee.?0 Before Florida could assert jurisdiction over the trustee, the op-
posing party had to show that the trustee had "minimum contacts" with the
state. The 'minimum contacts" had to include some act by which the trus-
tee had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
Florida.9 1 The Hanson trustee had not ventured into Florida, except to the
extent that it continued to conduct business with the trustor after she
moved to Florida.92 The unilateral actions of the trustor were insufficient to
satisfy the Hanson test.
93
A corporate trustee in Alaska is likely to be more aggressive than the
trustee in Hanson in pursuing out-of-state customers because the purpose of
the self-settled spendthrift trust statute is to lure business into state trust
departments.94 The national marketing of the trusts by a corporate trustee
may include establishing websites,95 advertising, conducting interviews with
national publications such as The Wall Street Journal and Forbes, placing
other articles in the national press,96 and providing promotional material
to estate planning practitioners in other states. Such activities may bring a
trustee within a state's long arm statute.97 Returning to our hypothetical, in
property to herself, her estate or her creditors. A limited or special power of appointment
limits the permissible recipients of the property to exclude the holder of the power and her
creditors and estate. REUTLINGER, supra note 6, at 76-78.
89. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 239-40.
90. It is important to note that the Supreme Court's holding went only to the issue of
whether the Florida court had personal jurisdiction over the trustee. The Florida court had
held that the trustee was an indispensible party, and the Supreme Court accepted the Florida
court's interpretation of Florida law. Id. at 245. The Court noted that because the Florida
court had "personal jurisdiction over the executor, legatees and appointees, there is nothing
in federal law to prevent Florida from adjudicating concerning the respective rights and li-
abilities of the parties. But Florida has chosen not to do so." Id. at 254.
91. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Nenno, supra note 86, at 3 ("The benefits of Delaware trust and tax law, coupled
with Delaware's ongoing efforts to maintain a salubrious trust climate, continue to make that
state a favored place for personal trusts."). At the time he authored the article, Mr. Nenno was
a Vice President and Trust Counsel employed by Wilmington Trust Company, Wilmington,
Delaware. See Wagenfeld, supra note 15, at 857-66 (noting that Alaska sought to attract trust
business with its new trust statute).
95. For an example of such a site, log onto Alaska Trust Company at <http://ww.alaska-
trst.com> (visited May 3, 2000).
96. See generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Unique Protection Under Alaska Law: Americans In
All States Can Benefit, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 1997, at 1; Lynn Asinof, Protection of Offshore Trusts
Comes Onshore in Two States, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at Cl; Douglas Blattmachr, Alaska
Trusts Offer Unequaled Asset Protection, PRIVATE ASsET MGMT., Feb. 23, 1998, at 8; Carolyn T.
Geer, Is Your Trust Well Placed?, FORBEs, June 16, 1997 at 190; Nenno, supra note 86.
97. Although there is some variation among state long-arm statutes, several of them
either explicitly provide or have been interpreted to mean that the only limits to personal
jurisdiction in the state are the constitutional limits set by the due process clause. WRICIT &
1211
85 IOWA LAW REVIEW
light of the increasingly broad scope of personal jurisdiction, it may be dif-
ficult for such a corporate trustee to claim insufficient contacts with Wash-
08ington.
Washington is one of the states that has set the reach of its personal ju-
risdiction at the limits of due process.9 The court in Washington would
have some flexibility in asserting jurisdiction over the trustee because the
due process analysis is sufficiently fluid.'00 Therefore, if the court were suf-
ficiently outraged by the defendant's attempted avoidance of liability, the
court could use that flexibility to give itselfjurisdiction and reach the trust.
In another context, the case of Sligh v. First National Bank l' is a good ex-
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1068 (2d ed. 1987). The constitu-
tional test of what constitutes a fair assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party
was initially formulated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). There the
Court set out a two-part test: (1) the nonresident must have certain minimum contacts with the
state, and (2) the exertion of personaljurisdiction cannot offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. Id. at 316. The test was further refined to distinguish between cases of
specific jurisdiction (where the nonresident's contacts gave rise to the litigation) and general
jurisdiction (where the nonresident's contacts with the state were so continuous and systematic
that the state could exert jurisdiction over the nonresident in an unrelated lawsuit). Helicop-
teros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984). For an assertion of specific
jurisdiction, there is another two-prong test: First, the court must analyze how numerous and
deliberate the contacts were, and, second, the court considers how close the relationship is
between the contacts and the litigation. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76
nn.17-18 (1985).
98. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the shrinking influence of lack of physical
presence as a due process and fairness objection, in light of new technology. In Burger King,
471 U.S. 462, the Court stated that "it is an inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a
substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across
state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted." Id. at 476. In Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the Court, citing Burger
King, stated that "[i]n 'modem commercial life' it matters little that [business] solicitation is
accomplished by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: The requirements
of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing
state." Id. at 308 (considering whether taxation by one state of an out-of-state mail-order busi-
ness violated due process).
The Internet personal jurisdiction cases come to varying results, but illustrate that
business solicitation by a website can bring the advertiser within the jurisdictional reach of a
state where the advertiser had no other "purposefully directed" activities in the state. For
example, a passive website that does not interact with visitors to the site was insufficient to
impose personal jurisdiction in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997), but was sufficient to impose personal jurisdiction in
Inset Systems., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). The court in Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), held that the
defendant's Internet activities should be analyzed on a sliding scale: on one end, the defen-
dant clearly engages in commerce over the Internet, and, at the other end, the defendant only
posts information on a website. Id. at 1124. See Matthew Oetker, Note, PersonalJuridiction and
the Internet, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 613 (1999) (noting inconsistencies in case law in determining
personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts); Todd Leitstein, Comment, A Solution for
PersonalJurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L REV. 565 (1999) (same).
99. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185; see Werner v. Werner, 526 P.2d 370, 374 (Wash.
1974) (describing Washington longarm jurisdiction as co-extensive with due process).
100. See supra note 97 (detailing the limits on personal jurisdiction).
101. 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 1997).
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ample of an outraged court taking extraordinary steps to reach assets in a
spendthrift trust. In Sligh, the court held that it was against public policy to
prevent the plaintiff, who had been paralyzed by a drunk driver, from col-
lecting because the defendant's mother had locked his assets away in a
spendthrift trust. 10 2 The Mississippi court, therefore, created a judicial ex-
ception to spendthrift enforceability for tort creditors.' in sum, the hy-
pothetical court will probably be able to assert personal jurisdiction over
the trustee without the actual presence of the trustee in the state. The trus-
tee's interaction with DD and its business contacts with other Washington
residents may be sufficient to support a finding of personal jurisdiction.
2. The Finality of a Finding of Personal Jurisdiction
What if the Washington court in our hypothetical improperly stretches
the boundaries of personal jurisdiction? If the trustee appears in the litiga-
tion in Washington, asserts the defense of lack of jurisdiction, and loses, the
trustee may then attempt to avoid enforcement of the judgment by claim-
ing that it is not entitled to full faith and credit. Such a claim would fail,
however, if the parties litigate the jurisdictional question in one court, and
that court enters a final judgment, because then even an erroneous decision
is entitled to full faith and credit.1°4
The trustee could not avoid full faith and credit by claiming that the
Washington judgment violates a fundamental public policy of Alaska. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recently confirmed that there is no such public
policy exception to full faith and credit. In Baker v. General Motors, 10 5 a Mis-
souri court had refused to honor a Michigan court's injunction prohibiting
a party to the Michigan litigation from testifying in other court proceed-
ings. The Supreme Court stated that Missouri could not refuse to honor
102. Id. at 1027.
103. Id. However, the Mississippi state legislature acted swiftly to overturn the court's
action by passing legislation reinstating spendthrift protection against tort creditors. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 91-9-503 (1998).
104. The Supreme Court first enunciated this principle in Baldin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men'sAss'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). The Courtwrote:
Public policy dictates that there be an end to litigation, that those who have
contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and that mat-
ters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We
see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case where one
voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he should
not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the
tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.
Id. at 525-26. See also Giehrl v. Royal Aloha Vacation Club, 937 P.2d 378, 380 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997); Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 570 A.2d 687, 689-90 (Conn. 1990); Ross & Chatter-
ton Law Offices v. Lewis, 441 N.E.2d 129, 130-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Corsica Cheese, Inc. v.
Roers Enterprises, 389 N.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Thoma v. Thoma, 934
P.2d 1066, 1069 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); L & W Air Conditioning v. Varsity Inn of Rochester,
371 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (N.Y. 1975); Reinwand v. Swiggett, 421 S.E.2d 367, 369-70 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1992).
105. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
106. Id. at 230. The Michigan litigation was between General Motors and a former em-
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the Michigan order on the grounds that it offended Missouri public policy.
The Court Stated, "[O]ur decisions support no roving 'public policy excep-
tion' to the full faith and credit due judgments." 07 Likewise, the hypotheti-
cal trustee could not claim that the Washington judgment offends Alaska
public policy as a reason to refuse to give full faith and credit to the Wash-
ingtonjudgment.
If the Washington court in the hypothetical case asserts personal juris-
diction over DD's Alaska trustee, the trustee will then face a strategic did-
sion. If the trustee appears and litigates the jurisdictional issue in Wash-
ington, it will be bound by the Washington judgment.'() On the other
hand, if the trustee does not appear, it will be free to challenge the credi-
tor's efforts to enforce the judgment in Alaska. By not appearing, however,
the trustee cannot participate in the resolution of the substantive issue-
whether PP and CC can, in fact, reach the trust assets. That would
presumably be a small price to pay, however, since DD would be active in
the litigation and would have an even stronger interest than the trustee in
vigorously defending against the creditors' attack on the trust. However,
the trustee's presence as a party has value to DD and to supporting
enforceability of the trust. Although the trustee and DD would raise the
same legal arguments, the trustee is the only party that can effectively argue
for the trustee's interest in protecting the integrity of the trusts, free from
outside influence, as an Alaskan entity doing business under Alaska law.
Suppose that the trustee declines to appear and protest the jurisdic-
tional issue in Washington. Assume further that PT gets a ruling from the
Washington court that DD is liable, and that the trust assets are available to
satisfy the judgment. Presumably, the trustee would refuse to honor the
ployee. Id. at 227. As part of the settlement of the case, the Michigan court enjoined the for-
mer employee from testifying in product liability cases brought against General Motors. Id. at
227-28.
107. Id. at 233. The court went on to hold that the Missouri court was nevertheless not
bound by the injunction because "the Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary issues in
a lawsuit brought by parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court." Id.
at 239. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 ("A valid judgment ren-
dered in one State of the United States will be recognized and enforced in a sister State even
though the strong public policy of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts
on the original claim."). Cf Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and
Credit toJudgents, 49 COLUM. L REV. 153, 178 (1949) (discussing the possibility of a public
policy exception and concluding: "[I]n the absence of case precedent, it seems impossible to
do more than suggest that such an exception to the full faith and credit clause does in all
probability exist .... Although such elaboration cannot be attempted at the present time, the
exception is believed to have a firm foundation."). Because the Baker Court cited to the Reese
and Johnson article, one could conclude that there may be some exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause relating to competing state interests that the Supreme Court would recog-
nize, albeit narrower than a "roving" public policy exception.
108. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) (discussing the general rule that "a
judgement is entitled to full faith and credit"); St. Sava Mission Corp. v. Serbian Eastern Or-
thodox Diocese, 273 Cal. Rptr. 340 (Cal. App. Ct. 1990) ("Where another state has fully and
fairly litigated its jurisdiction, and has finally decided the question, a second state may not
reexamine the question but must give the judgment of the first state full faith and credit.").
1214 [2000]
GRAYS GHOST
decision and would withold payment. PT would then register its judgment
and ask an Alaska court for an order forcing the trustee to comply.' The
Alaska court might rule that the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction,
since the personal jurisdiction issue was not "fully litigated," and could ref-
use to give full faith and credit to the Washington ruling. Such a ruling may
comply with Baker v. General Motors because the Supreme Court merely
held that a "final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudi-
catory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment,
qualifies for recognition throughout the land."'10 Without jurisdiction over
the trustee, the judgment would not be entitled to full faith and credit un-
der that formulation.
If the Alaska court upheld the jurisdictional decision, the trustee might
cite Baker as authority that "enforcement measures do not travel with the
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do." 1' The trustee's argument
would not prevail. In Baker, the Court held that the Missouri court could
not ignore the Michigan injunction on the ground of a public policy excep-
tion to full faith and credit.1 2 However, the Court ultimately permitted the
Missouri court to ignore the injunction because it went to admissibility of a
witness's testimony, and each court controls its own evidentiary rulings.' 11
The type of "enforcement" measures that the Baker Court exempted from
full faith and credit were "time, manner and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments."'" 4 By contrast, the trustee of DD's trust would be challenging
the substantive holding that the trust's spendthrift protections are invalid.
Even assuming the argument had merit, if the trustee had been properly
brought in as a party to the Washington action determining the enforce-
ability of the spendthrift provision, then issue preclusion would most likely
bind the trustee to Washington's dete1t 5 Thus, the trustee's best
strategy in this circumstance is to refuse to participate in the Washington
action, move the issue of personal jurisdiction to an Alaska court, and hope
that the Alaska court would take a narrower view of Washington's jurisdic-
tional reach. If the Alaska courts hold that Washington's assertion of per-
109. Arguably, an Alaska proceeding would not be necessary under that set of facts. The
Washington court has asserted personal jurisdiction over the trustee; therefore, the trustee is
refusing to follow an order from a court that has the same authority over it as an Alaska court
would. However, the creditor could bring an enforcement action in Alaska to reach the assets
under the principles of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, if the trustee
refused. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.200 (Lexis 1998) (providing procedures for enforcement in
Alaska of out-of-state judgments).
110. Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 233 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 235.
112. See supra notes 106-07 (describing the Court's holding in Baker).
113. Baker, 522 U.S. at 239.
114. Id. at 235.
115. See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-JURISDIcrION AND
RELATED MATTERS § 4416 (1981) (giving a general definition of issue preclusion, while admit-
ting that "[s]o many limitations have emerged in such ambiguous forms that it seems impossi-
ble to achieve any statement that is both graceful and complete"); see also Baker, 522 U.S. at
239 n. 11 (discussing the role of issue preclusion in that case where the Missouri plaintiffs were
not parties to the Michigan litigation).
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sonal jurisdiction was unconstitutional, then it would be up to the creditor
to seek the assistance of the U.S. Supreme Court. 16 If the Washington
court determines that it has jurisdiction over the Alaska trustee, that deci-
sion will be binding if the trustee litigates the issues in Washington, but the
ruling may be vulnerable to attack if the trustee fails to appear and waits
until the judgment is brought to Alaska.
3. The Trustee as a Necessary Party to the Litigation
Another part of the full faith and credit analysis is whether the trustee
is a necessary party to the dispute. Professor Scott" 7 seems to contemplate
that jurisdiction over the trustee is always necessary when considering issues
of the validity of the trust and distribution of trust assets.' 18 The general
rule is that the court must have jurisdiction over the trustee or the trust
property in order to determine trust issues.119 There are, however, some
instances where a court can decide trust issues without such jurisdiction. 20
In Acheson v. Dowell (In re Morgan Guarantee Trust Co.),' 21 for exam-
ple, a New York court addressed the enforceability of a California court's
interpretation of a California resident's will, in which the testator had exer-
cised a power of appointment122 over a New York trust. The California
court's ruling modified the language of the will because, as written by the
decedent, the will's disposition of the trust assets would have violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities. 23 The New York trustee was not made a party to
the action, and the heirs who would have benefited from an alternative
116. Although personal jurisdiction analysis generally focuses on issues of fairness, this
case includes parties with very different concerns. Usually, the court is concerned with fairness
to the party over whom jurisdiction is being asserted. However, fairness to the trustee (per-
sonal jurisdiction over whom is the critical issue) may not be a paramount concern, since the
trustee does not have a large personal stake in the outcome. The defendant/trustor has the
most interest in the outcome and is unquestionably within Washington's jurisdictional reach,
and fairness to the plaintiff would be a countervailing concern. In other words, fairness to the
trustee should not be the only question, and perhaps should be an insignificant question, in
the case where a defendant is attempting to move assets beyond her creditors' reach by trans-
ferring them to a person outside the jurisdictional reach of the court.
117. "Professor [Austin Wakeman] Scott, together with Professor George G. Bogert of the
University of Chicago, molded the modem law of trusts in this country. Their influential trea-
tises on the law of trusts, constantly cited by courts, are the starting point for analysis of ques-
tions of trust law." JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
558 (6th ed. 2000).
118. See 5AScorrsupra note 5, § 567.
119. "If... neither the trust property nor the trustee is subject to the judicial jurisdiction
of the state, the court has no jurisdiction over the trust, even thought the trust instrument
attempts to give it such jurisdiction." WALTERIW. LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLcT OF LAWS 257
(1940).
120. See supra note 84 (discussing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-703 as possible authority for a
court to assert such jurisdiction).
121. 269 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1971).
122. See supra note 88 (defining power of appointment). In this case, the California resi-
dent, through his California will, was specifying distribution of assets from a New York trust.
Acheson, 269 N.E.2d at 572-73.
123. Acheson, 269 N.E.2d at 573.
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ruling by the California court chose not to participate in the California pro-
ceeding. 124 As a threshold matter, the New York court decided that the
California court had jurisdiction to interpret the will of its decedent, al-
though that court did not have jurisdiction to decide the validity of the ex-
ercise of the power of appointment as it related to the New York trust. 125
The New York court noted that the California court had no authority to
order the New York trustee to distribute trust assets, but that the California
court's decision regarding interpretation of the language. in decedent's
will-exercising the power of appointment-was entitled to full faith and
credit. 126 The New York court ultimately gave full faith and credit to the
California court's resolution of the power of appointment issue and re-
solved the rights of the parties on that basis. The California court was es-
sentially able to rule on an issue that determined distribution of a New
York trust, without having jurisdiction over the New York trustee.
Unlike the California court in Acheson, the Washington court in our
hypothetical would face substantial resistance in claiming authority to rule
on distribution of DD's trust assets. In Acheson, the California court was us-
ing California law to rule on the terms of a California resident's will, with
the effect on the trust distribution flowing from that ruling. In our hypo-
thetical, the Washington court would be ruling based on the residency of
DD and her creditors and the situs of the events giving rise to the claims.
However, the Washington court's legal analysis (in determining whether
DD's creditors could reach the trust assets) would be an evaluation of the
Alaska trust and its terms which would be based on Alaska law. The issue
before the Washington court, therefore, would relate directly to the internal
administration of an out-of-state trust, as opposed to the issue before the
California court in Acheson, which was the interpretation of a direction to
the out-of-state trustee.
The Washington court could defend this direct intrusion into Alaskan
affairs by asserting that, as to its own residents, it should have the right to
determine the policy issue of whether the assets of a self-settled trust are
available to creditors when those creditors are Washington residents. In
order to receive full faith and credit, however, that jurisdictional determi-
nation would have to receive the same favorable reception in Alaska that
the California court's decision received in Acheson received when it was
taken to New York.127 Another difficulty is that even if the Washington
124. The potential beneficiaries were the decedent's children from a prior marriage. The
California court's interpretation benefited the daughter from the decedent's second marriage.
See id. at 573 (noting that the California court construed the will to give effect to the testator's
"obvious intent").
125. See id. at 575-76 (noting personal jurisdiction).
126. Id. The court noted that the California court did not rule on the validity of the trust
or the validity of the exercise of the power of appointment. Id. It further noted that the New
York trustee was not an indispensable party in the California proceeding because its role was
that of a "stakeholder" whose only interest was in carrying out a properly determined distri-
bution. Id.
127. The choice of law provisions in the Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Nevada
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court rules that the creditors can reach the trust assets, and that ruling is
entitled to full faith and credit, the ruling may not be binding on the Alaska
trustee. In Acheson, the trustee was a mere stakeholder who did not object to
the New York order which followed the California decision.128 If our hypo-
thetical trustee objected when the Washington judgment was brought be-
fore an Alaska court, the Alaska court could rule that the Washington
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit with respect to the parties
before the Washington court (PT, CC, and DD), but that the judgment
would not be binding on the trustee. 29
An interesting parallel to the dilemma of the trustee's necessary pres-
ence may be found in the state taxation area, where a state may attempt to
subject a trust located in another state to its income tax. The extra-
territorial enforcement problems with such an attempt are similar to our
case because it is an attempt by one state to impose obligations on an out-
of-state trustee. In order to prevent a trust from escaping the reach of its
income tax, states often define trust residency to include trusts whose ad-
ministration has moved outside of the state. For example, some states clas-
sify a trust as a resident entity of the state if the trustor was a resident at the
time the trust became irrevocable, or, in the case of a testamentary trust, if
the trustor was a resident at the time of his or her death.1 30 However, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may require a stronger
connection with a state before the trust is subject to that state's income
tax. 13 A Missouri case, In re Swift, 132 set forth six factors for courts to con-
sider in determining whether trust taxation was constitutional:
(1) the domicile of the settlor,
(2) the state in which the trust is created,
(3) . the location of trust property,
(4) the domicile of the beneficiaries,
(5) the domicile of the trustees, and
(6) the location of the administration of the trust.13 3
The court held that the first two factors alone were not enough to support
statutes would make that reception unlikely. ALASKA STAT § 13.36.035(c) (Lexis 1998); DEL
CODE ANN. tit 12, § 3571 (Supp. 1998); NEv. REV. STAT § 166.025 (1999); RI. GEN. LAWS §
18-9.2-2 (1999).
128. See Acheson, 269 N.E.2d at 575-76 (ruling that stakeholder was not an indispensible
party and therefore did not have to be joined).
129. Cf Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 240-41 (1998) (holding that even though
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, the court of one state could not rule on eviden-
tiary issues in another state's court proceedings); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)
(holding that in rem jurisdiction still required the court to find minimum contacts with per-
sons interested in the property).
130. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01 (7)(b) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.331
(West 1996); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(3) (McKinney 1999).
131. See In re Swift, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987) (holding that the trust's connections
to the state to support taxation must show the trust took advantage of the protection of the
state's laws).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 882.
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valid taxation because those factors did not indicate that the trust had the
advantage of the ongoing protection, or benefit of state law.13 4 At least one
of the other four factors (3 through 6) had to be present along with the first
two in order to find sufficient connection with the state to tax the trust.
135
Therefore, under the Swift test, the underlying question should be whether
the trust obtained any benefit or protection from the taxing state, so that
taxing the trust would be justified.
However, in a recent D.C. Court of Appeals decision, District of Colum-
bia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,'3 6 the court held that the District of Columbia
could constitutionally impose income tax on a trust whose only connection
with the District of Columbia was the fact that the trustor was a D.C. resi-
dent at the time of his death. 3 7 The trustee was a New York bank that ad-
ministered the trust from its New York offices, and none of the trust benefi-
ciaries were D.C. residents.138 The D.C. court stated that the Supreme
Court had expanded the method of due process analysis of state taxation
statutes in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.'3 9 Under Quill, the state may tax a
taxpayer if the taxpayer has minimum contacts with the state. 140 The Chase
Manhattan court, relying on Quill, determined that the trustor's death in the
District of Columbia gave the trust sufficient minimum contacts to be sub-
ject to D.C. tax.' 4 ' If the District of Columbia could constitutionally tax a
trust based solely on the trustor's residence there, by analogy, a non-Alaska
court may use similar residency connections to assert jurisdiction and rule
on the validity of an Alaska trust's spendthrift provision.
It remains unclear, however, whether a state could rely on such rea-
soning to statutorily define certain trusts as residents for jurisdictional pur-
poses.142 Some commentators argue that the Chase Manhattan court went
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997).
137. Id. at 543.
138. Id. at 541.
139. Id. at 542 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)).
140. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
141. Chase Manhattan, 689 A.2d at 545. In so ruling, the court emphasized that a testa-
mentary trustor's state of residence at time of death give the state in rem jurisdiction to adju-
dicate disputes related to the trust. Id. at 544 (citing GEORGET. BOGERT, TRuSTs § 177, at 686
(6th ed. 1987)).
142. This approach can be compared to the unfortunate statutory attack on same sex
marriages. Some states, in order to prevent giving full faith and credit to same sex marriages
which may become valid elsewhere, have passed legislation that excludes same sex marriages
from the general rule of comity for valid out-of-state marriages. For an example of such a
statute, see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (1999). This exclusion is authorized by the Defense
of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter DOMA]. Congress could simi-
larly authorize a state to assert jurisdiction over a trust set up by its resident for the purpose of
determining access by creditors. However, serious issues regarding the constitutionality of
DOMA under the Full Faith and Credit Clause have been raised and left unresolved. See gener-
ally Heather Hamilton, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A Critical Analysis of its Constitu-
tionality Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 DEPAUL L REV. 943 (1998) (exploring the
constitutionality of DOMA); Jennie R. Shuki-Kunze, Note, The "Defenseless" Marriage Act: The
Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act as an Extension of Congressional Power Under the Full
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too far.143 State legislatures may be tempted to construct a statute mirroring
the jurisdictional reach of Chase Manhattan if they want to deter their resi-
dents from placing the bulk of their assets in Alaska trusts because such
conduct might enable residents to avoid paying a liability owed to another
state resident.14 States might respond to this foreseeable problem by en-
acting statutes that give state courts jurisdiction to decide the vulnerability
of trust assets to debts of a trustor-beneficiary, regardless of where the trust
is administered, if the trustor was a resident of the state at the time she
established the trust and currently maintains that residency. 145 Although
there have been decisions holding that the trustor's residency at the time
the trust became irrevocable is, without more, an insufficient nexus to tax
the trust,146 the suggested statute would add the element of current resi-
dency of the trustor. Such a statute would satisfy the Swift test 147 because the
domicile of the trustee and the beneficiaries would be in the state claiming
jurisdiction over the trust. Of course, the Swift test was used in the context
of establishing the constitutionality of trust taxation, but the due process
test should be similar. The enforcement difficulty with this approach is that
even though the statute would give a Washington court jurisdiction to de-
cide whether the spendthrift clause is enforceable, unless the trustee was
made a party to the litiqation, it is likely that the trustee would not be
bound by the judgment. 48 Therefore, the Washington court may assert
jurisdiction over the enforceability of the spendthrift clause without the
trustee present as a party, but the court likely lacks the power to compel the
Faith and Credit Clause, 48 CASE W. RES. L REV. 351 (1998) (same). The full faith and credit
problem would not be presented with the type of state jurisdictional statute proposed here; the
constitutional issue would be whether such assertion of jurisdiction would satisfy due process
standards. Of course, another obstacle to such legislation is the fact that this issue is unlikely to
raise the same political fervor that same-sex marriage has raised.
143. See M. Read Moore & Amy L Silliman, State Income Taxation of Trusts: New Case Creates
Uncertainty, EST. PLAN. 200, 206-08 (1997) (stating that the D.C. court failed to make a con-
vincing argument of minimum contacts-unlike Qui/!, there was no "purposeful directing" of
activities to the state-and further criticizing the decision for its failure to analyze limitations
on in rem jurisdiction and problems where personal jurisdiction over the trustee is not pres-
ent).
144. See Roundtable Discussion, The International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TPANSNAT'L L 779, 793
(1999) (noting the remarks of Mr. Eric Henzy: "But the notion that three or four hundred
thousand people in Alaska ought to be deciding what folks in the lower forty-eight ought to be
doing about their tort systems, it's just not supportable.").
145. Note, however, that the Alaska statute purports to give its state courts jurisdiction to
determine these issues when the trust has an Alaska choice of law provision. ALASKA STAT. §
13.36.035(C) (Lexis 1998).
146. For example, see Blue v. Department of Treasuy, 462 NAV.2d 762 (Mich. CL App.
1990) ("We choose to follow the cases ... restricting the state's power to impose a tax on resi-
dent trusts where neither the trustee nor the trust property are within the state.").
147. See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating the Smift test).
148. See Moore & Silliman, supra note 143, at 207-08 (pointing out that state statutes
holding trusts liable for income tax, even though constitutional, could be unenforceable if the
state could not get personal jurisdiction over the trustee); see also supra note 124 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the similar issue presented in Acheson v. Dowell, 269 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y.
1971)).
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trustee to comply with its decision. The surest route to enforcement,
therefore, would be a definitive holding that the Washington court had
personal jurisdiction over the Alaska trustee.1 49
4. Choice of Law Issues
Assuming that the Washington court does assertjurisdiction to decide
the issue, it will then have to determine which state's laws apply. Presuma-
bly, the trust agreement will have a choice of law clause selecting Alaska law
as applicable.1 0 Under general choice of law principles, Alaska would have
sufficient contacts with the trust so that a Washington court would respect
the contractual choice of law. 151 However, there is a general public policy
exception to choice of law principles.152 Washington has expressed its dis-
approval of self-settled spendthrift trusts in a statute that provides that: "all
deeds of gift, all conveyances, and all transfers or assignments, verbal or
written, of goods, chattels or things in action, made in trust for the use of
the person making the same, shall be void as against the existing or subse-
quent creditors of such person." 53 Assuming that a Washington court had
jurisdiction over the issue, the court might determine that the Alaska stat-
ute is sufficiently contrary to its policies and override the trustor's choice of
law dause.15
B. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE CHALLENGE
There is another state court option available to DD's tort and contract
creditors: PT and CC could attack the transfer to the trust as a voidable
fraudulent conveyance. This claim differs from the claim that the spend-
thrift provision is invalid because it is irrelevant that the trustor transferred
property to an Alaska trust; a defrauded creditor could make the same
fraudulent transfer claim if DD had fraudulently transferred the property
to her Alaskan sister-in-law. If the creditors asserted such a claim, the
149. It is conceivable that there could be enough money at stake for the parties to appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, if it is necessary to decide the issue. In particular, if insurance
companies were concerned with the result (for example, if the plaintiffs damages would oth-
erwise be paid by other joint and severally liable defendants or by uninsured motorist protec-
tion) the insurance companies may be concerned with payments in future cases. Unfortu-
nately, a decision that would expose the trust assets to the judgment in this context would be
too fact-specific to have much relevance to future cases, since it would turn on personal juris-
diction of a particular state over a particular trustee. However, depending on the policy analy-
sis done to determine personal jurisdiction, the decision could be a sufficient cautionary tale
that would make the trusts less attractive or, at least, affect future litigation strategy.
150. The Alaska statute has a provision giving effect to Alaska choice of law provisions.
ALASKASTAT. § 13.36.035(c) (Lexis 1998).
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (stating test of va-
lidity of choice of law dause).
152. See id. § 187(b) (stating public policy exception).
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.020 (1998). This provision has remained unchanged since
enacted in 1881.
154. Compare In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998), discussed infra section IV,
where the bankruptcy court engaged in that exact analysis with respect to an offshore trust.
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Washington court would be faced with the question of whether Washington
or Alaska law applied. The trust instrument's choice of law designation is
irrelevant to this question because the issue of fraudulent conveyance is not
an issue of the contract between the trustor and trustee. Further, Alaska is
minimally linked to the issue of whether the transfer was, in effect, a fraud
on the creditor. 55 If the choice of law clause in the trust agreement applied
to a fraudulent conveyance question, then any debtor could control the
choice of law by entering into a contract with the transferee and making the
contract subject to the law of a state with a more favorable fraudulent con-
veyance law.' 56 The location of the assets before or after the transfer, 'con-
sequently, does not affect the choice of law. InJanies v. Powell, 5 7 for exam-
ple, a New York court considered whether a transfer of land in Puerto Rico
was fraudulent as to the transferor's New York judgment creditor. 58 The
court held that Puerto Rican law applied to answer that question, citing the
Restatement sections setting forth choice of law rules applicable to real
property. '9 However, the court commented in a footnote that:
Of course, if, in exploring the law of Puerto Rico, it were to be
found that it was specifically designed to thwart the public policy
of other states-for example, by denying a remedy to all judg-
ment creditors in the plaintiff's circumstances in order to attract
foreign investment in its real estate-the courts of this State
would be privileged to apply the law of New York rather than that
of Puerto Rico.160
In our hypothetical, PT and CC would argue that Washington law
should apply because Washington has the broader definition of fraudulent
transfer, as adopted from the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.161 The
majority of state laws are more favorable to creditors than Alaska's, as most
states have adopted a form of either the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
155. See Karen Gebbia-Pinetti, As Certain as Debt and Taxes: Estate Planning, Asset-Protection
Trusts and Conflicting State Law, in SC60 ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES 179, 243-
45 (A.LI.-A.BA. Course of Study, 1998) (discussing choice of law in fraudulent conveyance
claim).
156. See Ferrari v. Barclays Business Credit, Inc., 108 B.R. 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989), where
court refused to apply a choice of law clause in a security agreement that was allegedly a
fraudulent conveyance.
157. 19 N.Y.2d 249 (N.Y.1967).
158. Id. at 254.
159. Id. at258.
160. Id. at 259 n.4.
161. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and the Washington statute define "fraudulent
transfer," with respect to present and future creditors, to include transfers made with actual
intent to defraud as well as transfers for inadequate consideration that are made at a time
when the debtor was in business, in a transaction for which the debtor's remaining assets are
unreasonably small, or when the debtor should have known that she would incur debts beyond
her ability to pay. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.041 (1999). There is a broader definition of
fraudulent transfer applicable to present creditors, which would include all transfers for insuf-
ficient consideration when the debtor was insolvent immediately after the transfer. WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.40.051 (1999); UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT §§ 4, 5, 7A U.LA. (1999).
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or the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.' 62 Alaska law requires a show-
ing of actual intent to defraud.163 Washington law, however, would void the
transfer if.
(1) DT actually intended to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor;
(2) DT received no consideration for the transfer and was en-
gaged in or was about to be engaged in a business or a transaction
for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(3) DT received no consideration for the transfer and intended
to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that she
would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became
due. 
4
CC would rely on the second ground for voiding DD's transfer. PT could
claim that, in light of DD's history of driving drunk and her lack of ade-
quate insurance, the third prong should be applicable. Although PT is a
sympathetic plaintiff, the success of her argument will turn on whether DD
should have foreseen creating a large tort liability as a result of her behav-
ior. 165
Another reason that a creditor might prefer another state's fraudulent
conveyance law, is because Alaska's provision eliminates the benefit of the
statute of limitations discovery rule for creditors whose claims arose after
162. 5 DEBTOR-CREDrrOR LAw 22.03 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 1999). The law of
fraudulent conveyances is believed to have originated with the Statute of Elizabeth, an English
statute enacted in 1570. Id. The Statute of Elizabeth voided transfers made with intent to
delay, hinder, or defraud creditors; a finding of actual intent was a necessary element of the
action. Id. A few states (including Alaska) still use a version of the Statute of Elizabeth. Id. The
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) was promulgated in 1917 and introduced the
concept of constructive fraud, where certain objective facts -could establish a fraudulent con-
veyance without proving actual intent to defraud. Id. The UFCA was replaced in 1984 with the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), and most states followed suit and adopted the
UFTA in place of the UFCA, but several states have retained the UFCA. Id. A major impetus
for the UFTA was to coordinate the statute's terms with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
but there is a great deal of overlap (including the provisions for constructive fraud) between
the two uniform acts. Id.; see also Marty-Nelson, supra note 13, at 51-56 (discussing trusts and
fraudulent conveyance law).
163. ALASKASTAT. § 34.40.010 (Lexis 1998).
164. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.40.041(a) (1999). Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island all
have enacted the UFTA, so constructive fraud would be an available claim to a creditor. See
supra note 73 (listing the Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island statutes). Each state has short-
ened the limitations period, however. Nevada's in particular is abbreviated, allowing only two
years after the trust is established, or six months after discovery by an existing creditor. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing Nevada's statute).
165. See Gebbia-Pinetti,supra note 155, at 233:
For example, if a neurosurgeon cancels his malpractice insurance, transfers
assets into trust, then slips with the laser a week later and is sued for mal-
practice, it would be reasonable for him to believe that, if there was a claim,
he would not be able to pay. Voidability may turn on whether it was reason-
able for him to believe there would be a claim.
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the trustor established the trust.1 66 Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, such a creditor would have a year to act from the time the creditor
should reasonably have discovered the trust, if longer than the four-year
general limitations period. 67
If the Washington court (considering PT's and CC's claims of fraudu-
lent conveyance) applies Washington law and holds that the transfer to the
trust was fraudulent and therefore voidable, PT and CC may still have diffi-
culties. The trustee may refuse to comply with the court's order, claiming
lack of personal jurisdiction or impossibility. The trustee's claim of impos-
sibility would be based on the spendthrift clause as a bar to the trustee
complying with the order. That claim should be as ineffective as a claim by
an outright transferee that the transfer of property to that transferee was
complete and irrevocable and thus not subject to voidability because the
purpose and effect of fraudulent conveyance statutes is to void otherwise
complete transfers if done in fraud of creditors. 68 The trustee's lack-of-
personal-jurisdiction argument would present similar issues to those dis-
cussed above regarding attempts to get the trustee before the court to de-
termine the trust's validity. 69 Generally, the transferee is a necessary party
to the action to determine whether the transfer was fraudulent because the
transferee may be able to assert good faith defenses.' 70 The Washington
court may interpret the trustee's contacts with Washington in a different
light, however, because the claim is that the trustee accepted a fraudulent
transfer from a Washington resident-rather than the more benign act of
accepting the role of trustee.
Therefore, if CC and PT can establish that the transfer to the trustee
was fraudulent under Washington's fraudulent conveyance statute, and the
166. ALASKASTAT. § 34.40.110(d)(2) (Lexis 1998).
167. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9, 7A U.LA. 359 (1999). Note also that even
though Delaware, Rhode Island, and Nevada include the discovery rule in their general
fraudulent conveyance statutes, the discovery rule is eliminated with respect to creditors
claiming against a self-settled spendthrift trust, if their claims arose after the trust was estab-
lished, DEL CODEANN. tit. 12, § 3572 (Supp. 1998); 1999 Nev. Stat. 299, § 1; R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 18-9.2-4(b) (1999).
168. The remedy in a fraudulent conveyance action is to set aside the conveyance to the
transferee or, in the alternative, disregard the conveyance and attach or levy against the prop-
erty in the hands of the transferee. See generally UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AT § 7 7A
U.LA. (1999); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCEACT §§ 9(l)(a), (b); PETERA. ALCES, THE LAW
OF FRAUDULENTTRANSACTIONS 1 5.05[3) (1989 & Supp. 1999). See also In re Morris, 151 B.R.
900 (C.D. Il. 1993) (finding that the transfer of the proceeds of a life estate into a spendthrift
trust for the benefit of the debtor was ineffective and therefore should be set aside because the
life estate was subject to creditor claims).
169. See supra Part Ill(B) (1)-(2) (discussing potential personal jurisdiction problems in a
suit against a trustee).
170. See In re Schneider, 99 B.R. 52 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1989) (setting forth remedies for
fraudulent conveyance); T W M Homes, Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Inv. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 887
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (same); Tanaka v. Nagata, 868 P.2d 450 (Haw. 1994) (setting forth
remedies for fraudulent transfer); see also UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8, 7A U.LA.
351 (1999) (listing the defenses of transferee); Frank R. Kennedy, Reception of the Unifonn
Fraudulent TransferAct, 43 S.C. L. REV. 655, 673 (1992) (stating that ifa transferee is not made
a party, then the transferee could raise due process objections).
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Washington court can assert jurisdiction over the trustee, then CC and PT
could access the trust funds without resort to the Alaska courts. However, if
the Washington court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the Alaska
trustee, CC and PT could, alternatively, assert their fraudulent conveyance
claims in an Alaska court and could argue that Washington law should ap-
ply.
C. CONTEMPT
A court-imposed charge of civil (or criminal) contempt is the final
remedy available to assist the creditors in collecting if the trustor refuses to
retrieve the required funds from the trust. In a recent case, Federal Trade
Commission v. Affordable Media, L.L.C,17 1 the court was faced with the issue of
whether to uphold a civil contempt finding against the defendants, Mr. and
Mrs. Anderson. 172 In spite of an injunction, the defendants had failed to
repatriate funds that had been transferred to a Cook Islands trust. 173 The
Andersons argued impossibility, claiming that they had written to the Cook
Islands trustee to return the funds, but the trustee, based on the terms of
the trust, had refused. 74 The Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, affirmed the
finding of contempt, concluding that the defendants did not prove that
they in fact lacked the power to repatriate the assets, because they re-
mained in the role as trust "protectors."'17 5 The court looked askance at the
defendants' claim that they could not access the funds and explained:
"While it is possible that a rational person would send millions of dollars
overseas and retain absolutely no control over the assets, we share the dis-
trict court's skepticism."176 Because the court found that the defendants
retained control, it left "for another day" a more difficult question: whether
impossibility could be a defense when a defendant in fact had not retained
control, but the lack of control resulted from the defendants' deliberate acts
171. 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
172. Id. at 1231.
173. The facts of this case make it a lightning rod for offshore trust outrage-the defen-
dants were attempting to hide the profits from a pyramid scheme (where earlier investors are
paid off with money put up by later investors). The defendants purportedly sold interests in
shares of infomercials selling "such modern marvels as talking pet tags and water-filled bar-
bells." Id. at 1231-32. Investors were supposedly promised a 50% return in 60 days. Id. See
David C. Lee, Note, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Testing the Limits ofJudidal Tolerance in Estate
Planning, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 451, 509-15 (1999) (giving the description of the trial court pro-
ceedings in Affordable Media).
174. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1239. The defendants were co-trustees of the trust, to-
gether with the Cook Islands bank, but the trust agreement provided that upon occurrence of
an event of duress (such as the injunction to repatriate the funds) the defendants would cease
to be co-trustees. Id. at 1240 n.9.
175. Id. at 1240. A trust protector is a role often retained by the trustor of an offshore
trust. The trust protector's powers can include the power to oversee the trustees, veto trustee
actions, and replace trustees. Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting Offshore Asset Protec-
tion Trusts, 23 Esr. PLAN. 65, 70 (1996).
176. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1241. The fact that the defendants had been able to pull
more than $1 million from the trust to pay taxes was a tangible indication that they retained
control. Id. at 1242.
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in designing and setting up the trust.1 77
Contempt can be a very effective tool for a court that cannot assert ju-
risdiction over a trustee. In our hypothetical, the creditors could argue that
DD in fact retained sufficient control so that she could obtain the assets if
she desired. In the alternative, CC and PT could argue that the "impossi-
bility" claimed by DD was an intentional part of the design of the trust, and,
therefore, impossibility should not be an available defense.
Perhaps DD would respond to the self-created impossibility argument
by asserting that she acted in good faith-in other words, she created the
trust prior to incurring the liability and before the court order was foresee-
able. She would argue that there is an insufficient connection between her
actions and her inability to comply with the court order.178 Whether the
passage of time between transfer and a claim would bolster an impossibility
defense to contempt is unclear in this context. It is particularly uncertain
where the trustor deliberately created the impossibility for the purpose of
protecting the assets from exactly such a court order (even though DD
could not predict with precision the circumstances of the specific order).
DD could claim that her intent was to create estate tax advantages rather
than creditor protection, 17 9 but that argument is somewhat circular since
tax advantages depend in large part on the availability of the creditor pro-
tection. s° The threat of a contempt order from the Washington court
might be sufficient pressure on DD to comply with the Washington order,
or at least sufficient pressure to encourage a settlement.
D. SUMMARY
The potential success of PT and CC in accessing DD's trust assets
through state courts is unpredictable. Offshore trust proponents claim that
onshore trusts will be vulnerable because of full faith and credit
principles,' 8 ' and the onshore trust proponents claim that personal juris-
diction issues will protect trustors from other state judgments. 82 Both
claims are too simplistic. There are certainly avenues available to PT and
177. See id. at 1240 ("Recognizing this risk [of contempt], asset protection trusts typically
are designed so that a defendant can assert that compliance with a court's order to repatriate
the trust assets is impossible. ... ").
178. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 332 (1950) (stating that a witness must show
good faith in responding to a subpoena); Lee, supra note 173, at 474 (describing United States
v. Bryan).
179. See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text (describing the estate tax advantages
presented by the self-settled spendthrift trust).
180. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (summarizing the weaknesses in the
estate tax benefits). Another possible strategy available to DD would be to prove impossibility
by enduring a jail sentence. Depending on how long DD would have to sit in jail to convince
the judge that accessing the assets was in fact impossible, and depending on the amount of the
liability and the assets in the trust, it may be a worthwhile trade-off. See Lee, supra note 173, at
514 (discussing the possible strategy of the Andersons, who, in fact, were jailed for six months
and would be subject to future jail time until the assets were repatriated).
181. See Giordani & Osborne, supra note 16 (noting the disadvantages of onshore trusts).
182. See Nenno, supra note 86, at 1 1 (citing the benefits of onshore trusts).
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CC that are not available to creditors attacking an offshore trust, but the
jurisdictional problems may be significant. The magnitude of the disparity
between Washington's public policy prohibiting self-settled spendthrift
trusts and Alaska's departure from that traditional position, the defendant's
own behavior, and the uncertainty of personal jurisdiction standards could
lead a non-Alaska court to hold that creditors may reach the trust assets. In
the course of actual litigation, stranger things have happened.8 3
IV. BANKRUPTCY
The creditors' best route around the personal jurisdictional dilemma is
to set the issue before a bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy courts have national
jurisdiction.' 8' Thus, a bankruptcy court in Washington would have juris-
diction over our hypothetical Alaska trustee.185 PT and CC would have an-
other advantage if a bankruptcy court determined the validity of the
spendthrift clause. The bankruptcy code specifically provides that if a
spendthrift trust is valid under applicable state law, then it is excluded from
the bankruptcy estate. 186 Even if the bankruptcy court were located in.
Washington, it would be subject to choice of law rules. Therefore, if the
trust agreement provided that Alaska laws were applicable, the bankruptcy
court could validate the spendthrift protection. A federal court must, how-
ever, apply the choice of law rules of the forum state in which it sits. 8I Even
though local law in most states will follow the Restatement and respect a
choice of law applicable to a trust (as long as there is a sufficient nexus),188
the local law will probably contain a general public policy exception to
choice of law provisions.1
89
For example, in In re Brooks,190 the debtor transferred property to his
wife, who then transferred it to two offshore trusts in Jersey (Channel Is-
lands) and Bermuda. 191 Each trust provided that the local law of the coun-
183. See In re Strittmater, 53 A.2d 205, 206 (N.J. 1947) (holding that a testatrix who left
her estate to a women's rights organization lacked testamentary capacity because of "insane
delusions about the male").
184. FED. R. BANKR. P. § 7004(d).
185. The bankruptcy court could also determine the issue without the trustee's participa-
tion because the court has in rem jurisdiction over all property of the bankruptcy estate and
has jurisdiction to determine whether property is included in the bankruptcy estate. Henzy,
supra note 14, at 746..
186. 11 U.S.C. §541(c)(2) (1994).
187. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (expanding the
Erie rule).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICrs OF LAWS §§ 187, 273 (1971) (providing
that the choice of law is respected as long as the trust has a sufficient nexus to the state whose
law is selected).
189. See id. § 187(b) (providing that the court can disregard the choice of law if the chosen
state's law is contrary to public policy of the state where the court is deciding the issue); see also
supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the public policy
exception to enforcement of self-settled spendthrift trusts).
190. Sattin v. Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
191. Id. at 101.
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try where the trust was administered would apply to the trust.' 92 The debtor
in Brooks was the sole income beneficiary of the trusts, and the trustee had
discretion to distribute as much of the principal as the trustee deemed
"necessary, advisable or appropriate" for the debtor's health, comfort, and
support as well as for needs associated with any business enterprise of the
debtor.'93 The court treated the debtor, rather than his wife, as the settlor
of the trusts.' 94 The court also held that the law of Connecticut-the
debtor's residence and the forum state-applied, instead of the law of Ber-
muda and Jersey, because Connecticut would not enforce the law of an-
other jurisdiction which contravened Connecticut public policy. 195 The
court went on to hold that, under Connecticut law, a settlor's interest in a
trust is available to the settlor's creditors without regard to a spendthrift
provision.'9 6 Since the trusts' spendthrift provisions were not enforceable
under Connecticut law, the bankruptcy code provision recognizing spend-
thrift trusts did not apply. The court, therefore, deemed the trusts to be
part of the bankruptcy estate.197
Similarly, in Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy),'98 the
creditor urged the court to refuse to give the debtor a discharge in bank-
ruptcy because the debtor failed to disclose his interest in an offshore
trust.109 In considering the debtor's summary judgment motion, the court
determined whether New York law (the forum state) or Jersey, Channel
Islands, -law (the situs of the trust) should apply.200 It noted the general rule
that a court will respect the grantor's choice of law, unless it violates the
public policy of the forum state.20 ' The public policy exception would apply
only if the chosen law would "violate some fundamental principle ofjustice,
some prevalent concept of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of
the common weal., 20 2 It was absolutely dear to the court that New York's
policy forbidding debtors from putting their assets beyond the reach of
creditors while retaining use of the property was strong enough to trigger
the public policy exception. 0 ' The court also noted that Jersey's public
192. Id.
193. See id. (quoting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-8 (Mar. 20, 1997), In re
Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)).
194. Id. at 103.
195. See Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101 (citing Dick v. Dick, 355 A.2d 110 (Conn. 1974)). The
court also held that Connecticut law applied because the legality of a trust of peirsonalty is
determined by the law of the settlor's domicile and cited that rule as an exception to the rule
that a choice of law provision in a trust will be respected. Id. at 104.
196. Id. at 103-04.
197. Id. Of course, the enforceability of that ruling would be in doubt, since the courts of
Jersey and Bermuda do not have to recognize the ruling of a U.S. bankruptcy court. Osborne,
Asset Protection, supra note 12, i 1407.3(F), 1407.8(F).
198. 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
199. Id. at 688.
200. Id. at 696.
201. See id. at 698 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONRITS OF LAWS § 270).
202. Id. at 700.
203. Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 700. It appears that most states would decide as the New York
bankruptcy court did and would have strong countervailing public policy against the use of
1228 [20001
GRAYS GHOST
policy in support of self-settled spendthrift trusts seemed limited to busi-
ness promotion.204 The court therefore concluded that the trust property
was property of the bankruptcy estate and denied the debtor's summary
judgment motion.205 .
Therefore, if PT and CC attempted to access the trust assets through a
bankruptcy proceeding in Washington, the bankruptcy court could obtain
jurisdiction over the trustee and-following the reasoning of the court in
Brooks and Portnoy-rule that Washington law applied to the validity of the
spendthrift provision. The bankruptcy court could then include the trust
assets in the bankruptcy estate and subject them to the creditor's claim.
Bankruptcy of the judgment debtor thus would appear to be the opti-
mum route for the creditor. However, CC and PT may face some obstacles
in getting the issue before a bankruptcy court in Washington. DD may at-
tempt to avoid the Brooks and Portnoy result by filing for bankruptcy in a
state that would not have a countervailing public policy against self-settled
spendthrift trusts (e.g., Alaska),20 6 or she could refrain from filing for bank-
ruptcy. If DD chose to refrain, use of an involuntary petition would be nec-
essary.
.An involuntary petition is only available under certain circumstances.
If the debtor has twelve or more eligible creditors, at least three must file
the petition.20 7 If the debtor has fewer than twelve eligible creditors, then a
single creditor can file.208 Furthermore, the claims of the petitioning
creditors cannot be contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide dis-
pute.209 If the creditor filing the petition is the debtor's only creditor, courts
differ on whether to allow an involuntary petition because the single credi-
tor may have difficulties satisfying section 303(h), which requires a showing
that the debtor is generally not paying his debts as they become due.210
Some courts have eased the test for single creditor petitions when the
creditor has no other adequate remedy or when there is a showing of fraud,
self-settled spendthrift trusts. However, that argument may be more difficult in Florida and
Texas because both states allow unlimited homestead exemptions, thereby allowing debtors to
convert assets into a residence to protect them from creditors. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 4(a); TEX.
PROP. CODE § 41.002 (Supp 2000).
204. Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 700.
205. Id. at 703.
206. The debtor can file in any district where he is domiciled or has a residence or princi-
pal place of business, or where principal assets of the debtor are located. 28 U.S.C. § 1408
(1994). Official form one provides that venue is satisfied as long as one of the four grounds
exists for the 180 days prior to filing, or if one of the four conditions is satisfied for that dis-
trict for a longer period than any other district in the 180-day period preceding filing.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY APP. pt. 2(d), 301.10 (15th ed. 1996).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (Supp. 1999). Insiders and transferees of voidable transfers are
not included when counting creditors for this purpose. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (Supp. 1999).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. 1999).
209. Id. Classifying claims under these standards can be difficult. For example, it is unclear
whether a tort claim has to be reduced to judgment in order to be considered noncontingent.
See COLLIER, supra note 206, 303.03[2][a][ii] (presenting arguments on both sides of the
issue).
210. COLLIER, supra note 206, 303.04[5].
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trick, artifice, or sham.2 " If a creditor of an Alaska trust grantor was the
only creditor, it is likely that the court would allow the involuntary petition
because that case would fit within one of these exceptions.
Therefore, if PT and CC want to enforce their claims against DD's
trust assets, an involuntary bankruptcy petition in Washington may be pref-
erable to attempting an enforcement action in Washington state courts.
The bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction over the trustee, and a bank-
ruptcy court sitting in Washington could find that Washington law governs.
V. CONTRACT CLAUSE CHALLENGE
A contract creditor, like CC, might seek to invalidate the Alaska trust
statute by raising a claim that the statute violates the Contract Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, which states: "No State shall... pass any. . . Law im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ,,212 The original purpose of the
clause is somewhat unclear,2 13 but a prevalent theory is that it was passed in
reaction to state laws relieving farmers of their mortgage debts owed to East
Coast banks.214 The Contract Clause has had an interesting evolution: it
enjoyed a lengthy heyday of almost a century, beginning in 1810,215 and
continued to flourish as a means of striking down state regulation for the
next eighty years. Upon the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,216
however, the Due Process Clause, which was broader than the Contract
Clause in scope both substantively and jurisdictionally, 217 became a more
popular tool for challenging state action. The Supreme Court began a
trend of refusing Contract Clause challenges and upholding state laws as
valid exercises of police power.2 18 Nevertheless, the Contract Clause sur-
vives as a limitation on states' powers to legislatively change the terms of
existing contracts.2 19
211. See In re 7H Land & Cattle Co., 6 B.R. 29, 34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980) (following this
rule and citing COLLIER, supra note 206, 303.04[5]).
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1. Note that this challenge would be unavailable to PT, a
tort creditor.
213. See J. Michael Veron, The Contracts Clause and the Court: A VFew of Precedent and Practice
in Constitutional Adjudication, 54 TUL L REV. 117, 123-24 (1979) (discussing the history of
adoption of the Contract Clause); see also BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3-7 (1938) (discussing the problems addressed by the Contract Clause).
214. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 471-72 (1934) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting) (discussing this problem as motivation for the Contract Clause); see also Note,
Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L REV. 1414, 1414-20 (1984) (discussing the history
of the Contract Clause).
215. See Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (using the Contract Clause to strike
down a Georgia law).
216. U.S. CONT. amend. XIV.
217. The Due Process Clause, found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is
binding on federal as well as state authority. The Due Process Clause reaches a broader range
of rights than the Contract Clause, which refers only to contractual interests. Also, due process
rulings in federal legislation would be available support in challenges to state legislation. See
Veron, supra note 213, at 142 (explaining this reasoning).
218. See id. at 141-49 (discussing this period of Contract Clausejurisprudence).
219. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) ("None-
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The elements of a Contract Clause challenge are as follows. First, by
the express terms of the Clause, there must be a contractual obligation pre-
sent. Second, a plaintiff must show that the legislation at issue substan-
tially impairs the existing contractual obligation.22' This second element
requires that there be more than minimal interference, 2  and the impair-
ment must be an impairment of the contract rather than just an impairment
of remedies available upon breach.228 Finally, if the court determines that
the state law is a substantial impairment of the existing contract right, it
then questions whether the state has a justifiable purpose for passing the
law and whether the legislature narrowly drafted the statute to achieve that
purpose.224
A. WHETHER THEALASKA LEGISLATION ISA SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT OF
EXISTING CONTRACTS
CC can easily meet the first prong of a Contract Clause challenge be-
cause he had a contract with DD. However, the second element-substan-
tial impairment-immediately presents two obstacles to the contract credi-
tor. First, does the Alaska statute sufficiently impair existing contracts? Sec-
ond, is the statute merely a limitation on an unpaid creditor's remedy,
rather than an impairment of the underlying contractual promise to pay?
1. Effect on Existing Contracts
As to the first question, DD may argue that the Alaska statute's
fraudulent conveyance provision225 sufficiently protects existing contracts.
However, the statute bars an existing creditor from collecting against the
trust assets, unless the trustor had actual intent to defraud.226 The creditor
must also bring the action within four years of the establishment of the trust
or within one year of its discovery of the transfer.227 Contrary to the current
statute, the prior Alaska law did not permit the debtor to transfer assets and
retain an interest in them.228 Previously, Alaska's fraudulent conveyance
theless, the Contract Clause remains part of the Constitution. It is not a dead letter."); United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (upholding the use of the Contract
Clause as a limit on state power); Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir.
1991) (same); Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 1998) (same); see also Ronald D. Rotunda,
The Impairments of Contracts Clause and the Corporation: A Comment on Professors Butler's and Rib-
stein's Thesis, 55 BROOK. L REv. 809, 811 (1998) (stating that the Contract Clause has a real
but limited role in restraining state regulatory power).
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 1.
221. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244.
222. Id. at 245.
223. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200-01 (1819).
224. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
225. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998).
226. Id. § 34.40.110(a).
227. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998); DEL CODEANN. tit 12, § 3572 (1998); 1999
Nev. Stat. 299, § 1; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-4(b) (1999).
228. Former section 110 read as follows: "A deed of gift, a conveyance or a transfer or
assignment, oral or written, of goods and chattels or things in action made in trust for the
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statute only voided transfers to third persons on a showing of actual intent.
Therefore, the effect of the amendment is to allow a self-settled trust that
same protection. That change would have a substantial impact on the
creditor's situation. The debtor, prior to the amendment, could only pro-
tect assets by transferring them to third parties and retaining no interest
(assuming the debtor could avoid the actual intent to defraud test). Upon
passage of the amendment to the statute, the debtor has the option of pro-
tecting assets and retaining them for his own use, losing only a modicum of
control.
Another change from prior law is the reachback period; prior Alaska
law did not specifically limit the time in which a party could make a chal-
lenge.229 The 1997 legislation limits all challenges to four years after the
trust has been established, or one year after discovery, if later, for creditors
existing at the time of the trust's inception. 50
One possible response to claims of substantial impairment (although
not attractive to the debtor) would be to challenge the assumption that
Alaska law would apply to the transfer.231 If the transaction arose in another
state, and Alaska's only contact with the debtor was the debtor's establish-
ment of a trust, then the creditor could argue that the law of the state that
had the most contacts with the transaction at issue should apply in deciding
whether the transfer was fraudulent. If successful, the creditor would retain
the same protections that it had under law prior to passage of section
110.232 Of course, Alaska may be the state with the most contacts, or the
applicable law may be similar to Alaska's. 23 However, if the existing credi-
tor could assert another forum's fraudulent conveyance protection, the
creditor would enjoy the same protection that existed prior to the passage
of the statute and is arguably unaffected by the legislation. Under this ar-
gument, the most that a creditor could hope to void under the Contract
Clause would be the statutory provisions requiring the application of Alaska
person making the deed, conveyance, transfer, or assignment is void as against the creditors,
existing or subsequent, of the person." ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 1949) (repealed
1997).
229. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998) (providing that Alaska's general fraudulent
conveyance section, which does not have a statute of limitations, is now inapplicable to self-
settled trusts); see also Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 155, at 235 (describing the reachback period
under ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110).
230. ALASKASTAT. § 34.40.110(d) (Lexis 1998).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54 (discussing choice of law decisions).
232. See id (discussing the effect of rejecting Alaska choice of law).
233. If Alaska is the state with the most contacts, then there are no alternate state's laws
and policies to fall back on, and the Contract Clause claim is probably the best avenue for that
creditor. If the state with the most contacts is one of the eight other states that, like Alaska, has
a fraudulent conveyance statute modeled after the Statute of Elizabeth, which does not include
constructively fraudulent transfers, then arguably the legislation did not strip the creditor of
much protection. See supra note 162 (describing fraudulent conveyance statutes). Of course,
the state may have a longer statute of limitations than that permitted under the Alaska statute.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 155, at 235. The creditor from that state would have the same
arguments of impairment as discussed supra text accompanying notes 229-S0.
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law.234 That would limit the reach of the fraudulent conveyance protection.
However, the effect of voiding those provisions may be substantial. Rein-
stating the home state's fraudulent conveyance protection could give an
existing creditor a longer time frame, and broader grounds, to void the
transfer.2
35
Therefore, the creditor with the best Contract Clause argument is the
Alaska creditor whose claim existed at the time the legislature passed the
statute. If CC made the Contract Clause claim, DD may counter that the
Washington fraudulent conveyance remedy, still available to him, is suffi-
dent protection. CC could reply that the transfer does not meet the re-
quirements, even the broader requirements under Washington's state
law,236 of a fraudulent conveyance and, therefore, is no protection at all.
Alaska's statute has created an unfairness that the drafters of the fraudulent
conveyance statutes did not contemplate. At the time the contract was
made, the creditor was able to rely on the debtor's current financial situa-
tion. In evaluating a debtor's risk, a creditor presumably considers the pos-
sibility of financial setbacks for the debtor, assuming that the debtor would
take steps to prevent such setbacks out of personal interest. The creditor
could also consider the possibility that the debtor may give assets away, thus
increasing the creditor's risk of not getting paid. However, prior to the
adoption of section 110, the debtor's self-interest in retaining both assets
and the fraudulent conveyance laws both protected the creditor against that
risk.
The change introduced by the statute, even for an out-of-state creditor
with Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) protection, 37 is that the
debtor could now set up a "rainy-day fund," retaining access to the money
as a personal hedge against future setbacks while leaving the creditor with-
out such a lifeboat. The debtor is now able to shift the lion's share of risk of
future financial setbacks onto the creditor, thereby perhaps increasing the
debtor's risk tolerance. While prior to Alaska's statutory amendment, the
debtor's own self-interest, and cognizance that she would go down with the
ship, provided the creditor with some protection from such a setback, the
passage of the statute created a shift in loyalty, a factor the creditor was
depending on when the debt was created.
The first response to a plaintiff who claims substantial impairment is
that the impairment of contracts was simply incidental to the much broader
234. ALASKASTAT. § 13.36.035(a), (c)-(e) (Lexis 1998).
235. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the discovery rule available to
claims under a state that has enacted UFTA).
236. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for proving a
fraudulent conveyance). CC could, as noted above, assert that the second ground for a finding
of fraudulent conveyance, involvement in a business that makes the debtor's remaining assets
after the transfer unreasonably small, makes the trust transfer fraudulent. However, CC would
not be relying on the Contract Clause argument if he had been successful in arguing fraudu-
lent conveyance.
237. See supra note 161-62 and accompanying text (describing UFTA provisions).
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underlying purpose of the statute. In Exxon Corp. v. Eagleton,23 8 for exam-
ple, an Alabama statute prohibited oil and gas producers from passing a tax
increase on to purchasers. 23 9 Prior to enactment, producers had entered
into contracts that required the purchasers to pay any increase in tax. 40
Those producers sued, claiming a violation of the Contract Clause.24' The
Eagleton Court held that there was no violation of the Contract Clause be-
cause the statute was a "generally applicable rule of conduct" that inciden-
tally affected the contracts at issue.242 The Court distinguished the statute at
issue in Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus.243 That Minnesota statute set
vesting requirements for pension interests in certain existing retirement
plans.244 The Spannaus Court viewed that statute as directly aimed at the
private contract between employer and employee,245 rather than a gener-
ally applicable rule of conduct.
A debtor-trustor like DD could correspondingly argue that the legis-
lature intended for the Alaska statute to protect trust assets from all forms
of creditors, not just contract creditors, and that the effect it has on existing
contract rights is merely incidental. Although a debtor may use the statute
to avoid contractual obligations, the reach of the statute is much broader,
and the focus is not on contractual relations. Also, the statutory protection
of trust assets does not automatically affect obligations. The debtor's assets
outside of the trust would still be subject to the debt, and the debtor would
have to take the rather dramatic action of moving substantially all of his or
her assets into such a trust before affecting his contractual obligation.
This argument was supported by the facts in Eagleton, but the argu-
ment cannot be made to support the Alaska statute. In Eagleton, there was a
strong public purpose in utilities rate setting.2 46 In addition, the subject
matter of the contract was traditionally subject to heavy regulation, and,
therefore, statutory changes were foreseeable to the parties.24" Neither fac-
tor is present here. In fact, particularly for out-of-state debtors and credi-
tors, the subsequent legislation that allowed debtors to place assets outside
the reach of the contractual debt were most certainly an unforeseeable
event, since the statutes were a dramatic departure from the tradition of
spendthrift trusts and established law.
2. Impairment of Contract or Remedy
DD could also answer the Contract Clause challenge to Alaska's statute
238. 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
239. Id. at 179.
240. Id. at 179-80.
241. Id. at 179-80.
242. Id. at 191-92.
243. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
244. Id. at 238-39.
245. Id. at 244, 248-49.
246. The Court cited several Supreme Court decisions allowing states to set utilities rates
even though such rates displaced previous contract terms. Eagleton, 462 U.S. at 192-93.
247. Id. at 194 n.14.
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by claiming that only the contract remedy is impaired, rather than the
contract itself. Early cases made the distinction between contract right and
a remedy for contract breach in this context and held that mere impair-
ments of remedy did not violate the Clause, but that distinction was quickly
eroded,248 and courts have not discussed it in recent cases.249 Even in the
earlier cases that made the distinction, if the impairment of the remedy was
so extreme that it essentially relieved a party of its obligations under the
contract, then the remedy impairment was a violation of the Contract
Clause. As the Supreme Court stated in McCracken v. Hayward, "any law
which in its operations amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights ac-
cruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is di-
rectly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution."250An early example of a constitutional change in remedy was the aboli-
tion of laws allowing a creditor to imprison the debtor, leaving the creditor
with "his remedy against property alone."251 However, courts refused to
enforce homestead laws and similar property exemption provisions against
creditors who were collecting on debts incurred before the exemption laws'
enactment.252 These provisions were held unconstitutional because the im-
pairment of the remedy essentially excused'the debtors' contractual obliga-
o253 As Justice Cardozo stated:
[I]n the books there is much talk about distinctions between
changes of the substance of the contract and changes of the rem-
edy. . . . The dividing line is at times obscure. . . . Not even
changes of the remedy may be pressed so far as to cut down the
security of a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a spirit
of oppression.
2 54
But as we have seen, courts always limited and qualified the right-
248. See Robert L Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L REV. 512,
533-57 (1943) (discussing indetail the impairment remedy).
249. See, e.g., Eagleton, 462 U.S. 176; Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234
(1978).
250. McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608, 612 (1844). See 1 THoMS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTUIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 585-86 (Walter Carrington, ed., 8' ed. 1927):
Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will
of the State, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the
contract, and it does not impair it, provided it leaves the parties a substan-
tial remedy, according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the
contract was made.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
251. 1 COOLEY, supra note 250, at 588-89; see Hale, supra note 248, at 535-36 (providing
further discussion of this example).
252. See, e.g., Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. (6
Otto.) 595 (1877); Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790 (1874); Squire v. Mudgett, 61 N.H. 149
(1881); Davidson v. Richardson, 91 Pac. 1080 (Or. 1907). Cf. McAfee v. Covington, 71 Ga. 272
(1883) (holding statute applicable to previous rights of action for torts because tort creditor
not protected by Contract Clause).
253. 1 COOLEY, supra note 250, at 593.
254. Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56,60 (1935).
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remedy distinction rather than determining constitutionality of a law by
automatically characterizing it as affecting either a right or remedy. Argua-
bly, the distinction was an alternative way of stating the substantiality re-
quirement, or perhaps a subset of that requirement, and it fell out of favor
and was eventually deemed unnecessary. It seems particularly superfluous
since it was apparently never used to bless a legislative enactment that, al-
though on its face applied to remedy, was in fact a substantial
impairment.
255
The right-remedy distinction may also be another way of stating the
role of expectation in Contract Clause analysis. A contracting party cannot
reasonably assume that there will be no future changes in state law deter-
mining contractual remedy. For example, in El Paso v. Simmons, 256 a law
shortening the time to reinstate a defaulted land daim was not a Contract
Clause violation because the claimant could not reasonably expect the law
regarding that issue to remain unchanged.
In sum, CC can argue that the Alaska statute substantially impaired his
contract with DD because it allowed DD to place her assets beyond CC's
reach without sacrificing her own access to those funds. At the time CC
contracted with DD, he relied on her net worth as an indication of a rela-
tively low risk in relying on her promises, but the statute allowed her to
avoid those promises. Even if the impairment was characterized as affecting
only the remedy, the impairment leaves CC with no remedy, essentially
voiding DD's contractual obligations, and, therefore, it satisfies the sub-
stantial impairment test of a Contract Clause challenge.
B. DETERMINING WHETHER A SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIwENTIS NEVERTHELESS
JUSTIFIABLE
Once a court determines that the challenged law substantially affects
existing contract rights, it does not necessarily follow that the law violates
the Contract Clause.25 7 The statutory restriction may nevertheless be con-
stitutional if it imposes reasonable conditions and if it is appropriately tai-
lored to address the problem. In Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, the
Court held that the Minnesota statute, which affected pension vesting
rights, violated the Contract Clause for the following reasons: there was no
public emergency, the statute addressed no broad social issue, the focus of
the legislation was too narrow,258 and, at the time the law was passed, Con-
gress was about to pass the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA),259 which would have made the statute's effect extremely
255. See I COOLEY, supra note 250, at 598 (giving examples of statutes substantially im-
pairing remedies that were struck dovn); Hale, supra note 248, at 533-57 (taking an in-depth
look at remedy distinctions).
256. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
257. See Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240 (1978) (explaining how a
substantial impairment is not equivalent to a Contract Clause violation).
258. The statute only affected employers with over 100 employees and only applied when
the employer closed its Minnesota office or terminated its pension plan. Id. at 248.
259. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1971, 29 U.S.C. §§ I001-I 145 (1999).
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temporary.260
Of course, in some circumstances the fact that a statute is narrowly
drawn and temporary may support a finding that it is appropriately tai-
lored to the situation. For example, in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell,261 the Court upheld a mortgage moratorium law enacted to pro-
vide relief to homeowners facing foreclosure during the Depression. 262 The
validity of the legislation was supported by the fact that the legislation was
of temporary duration and that the legislature carefully tailored the statute
to address the particular emergency, without being overbroad.2 ,3 Con-
versely, in Spannaus, the Court held that the narrow scope of the statute was
unreasonable because it failed to effectively address the state's claim that it
was protecting its citizens' retirement benefits.2M The Spannaus Court also
pointed out that this was not an area that the state had previously subjected
to regulation, so the parties might not have foreseen a change in the law.
265
The requirement that the legislative scheme be a reasonable restric-
tion in order to override the Contract Clause prohibition does not mandate
that a statute be flawless. In Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc. v. Arkansas,2  a
waste facility that had filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11
brought a Contract Clause challenge against a state statute restricting im-
portation of out-of-state solid waste. 267 The court noted that, similar to
Blaisdell's mortgage moratorium law, this legislation addressed a public
environmental emergency, the per diem capacity restrictions were reason-
able, and the restrictions were of limited duration. 268 The court held that
complaints about the implementation of the legislative scheme, such as
problems at other landfills, were irrelevant: "Arkansas need not enact the
most reasonable scheme, it need only enact a reasonable scheme."269
Therefore, the Alaska trust statute need only be reasonable.
Assuming CC can show that his contract right has been substantially
270 b.betaimpaired, it is probable that the Alaska statute would not survive the rea-
260. ERISA preempted state regulation in this area. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 248 n.21.
261. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
262. Id. at 447.
263. Id. at 444-47.
264. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1978); id. at 252
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 250. The Eagleton Court upheld the statute in part because of the fact that the
industry affected was traditionally subject to heavy regulation and therefore the parties' ex-
pectations had to allow for future changes in the law. Exxon Corp. v. Eagleton, 462 U.S. 176,
194 n.14 (1983). See also Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 38
(1940) (making an issue of the fact that regulations were in place at the time the shares were
purchased in the corporation); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & light Co. 103 S. Ct.
697, 706-09 (1983) (noting that the potential for extensive regulation was recognized in the
contract).
266. 137 B.R. 735 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
267. Id. at 738.
268. Id. at 745.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 225-38 and accompanying text (discussing the showing of substantial
impairment).
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sonable review test set out in Blaisdell and Spannaus.27 1 DD would have to
show that the Alaska statute is properly tailored to address a social issue,
and that the contractual limitations are reasonable. This will be difficult for
DD because it is hard to imagine what public purpose self-settled spend-
thrift trusts serve. The arguments in favor of such trusts usually focus on the
litigation explosion and the risk of unusually high jury awards. 212 Also, the
justification that the grantor should be able to place restrictions on a gift to
a third person 273 does not apply to the self-settled spendthrift trust. The ap-
parent purpose of increasing the trust business in state banks27 4 is also not a
policy that courts would likely give deferential treatment.
The Contract Clause cases where the courts analyze statutes revoking
beneficiary designations on divorce provide some guidance about how a
court might view the public purpose and reasonableness of the self-settled
spendthrift trust legislation. The beneficiary revocation statutes generally
provide that upon dissolution of a marriage, any designation of the now ex-
spouse as beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, pension assets, joint ten-
ancy accounts, and the like are automatically revoked.275 Plaintiffs have
challenged these statutes, with respect to beneficiary designations in exis-
tence at the time of passage of the legislation, as violating the Contract
Clause.27
6
In Parsonese v. Midland National Insurance Co., 27 7 the court held that a
Pennsylvania statute revoking beneficiary designation upon divorce vio-
271. See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying text (describing the Blaisdell-Spannaus test).
272. Mr. Barry Engel notes:
I mean, you talk about the impact on society. You have obstetricians who are
no longer practicing. You have people who are hesitant to go into business
in certain areas-I mean, there is a huge cost to what has gone on in the last
ten to twenty years as a result of what some would call, and not necessarily
myself, believe it or not, but what some would call a legal system run amuck.
Roundtable discussion, supra note 144, at 794. See also infra Part VII (discussing arguments
against self-settled spendthrift trusts based on tort reform).
273. See GRISWOLD, supra note 24, § 552 (noting that the maxim cuius est dare eius est dispon-
sere-whoever it is to give, has the power to dispose as he pleases--was often given as the
reasoning supporting spendthrift trusts).
274. See Wagenfeld, supra note 15, at 857-66 (noting state's economic incentives to estab-
lish self-settled spendthrift trusts).
275. For an example of such a statute, see WASH. REv. CODE CH.§ 11.07 (1998).
276. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
statute violated Contract Clause); In re Estate of Dobert, 963 P.2d 327, 333, 333 n.4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that ex-spouse and insurance company did not have standing to bring
Contract Clause challenge); Parsonese v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 819 (Pa. 1998)
(holding statute violated Contract Clause). An interesting aspect of both Ritter and Dobert is
that the deceased ex-spouse had apparently been killed by the surviving ex-spouse who was
arguing against application of the beneficiary revocation statute. The possible application of a
slayer statute was not raised in Dobert, but the court in Ritter remanded on the issue of whether
the state's common law rule prohibiting slayers from inheritance would prevent the ex-spouse
from taking the insurance, since the beneficiary revocation statute had been held invalid.
Whirlpool, 929 F.2d at 1324 (citing State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027
(Ok. 1985)).
277. 706A.2d 814 (Pa. 1998).
1238 [2000]
GRAYS GHOST
lated the Contract Clause with respect to beneficiary designations in place
at the time the legislation was passed. s The court reached this contusion
because it was unimpressed with the emergency nature of the statute.
279
The legislature designed the statute to protect "only divorced owners of life
insurance policies.. . who inadvertently ne( lect to revoke pre-divorce des-
ignations of their spouses as beneficiaries." 0 However, the statute's broad
coverage was protecting a special group "without any suggestion that their
'lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare' need special protection
under the police power of the state. ' 281 The court was also concerned with
the statute's unlimited duration.8 2
Similarly, the recent Alaska legislation addresses no emergency, is un-
limited in duration, and offers protection to one class of persons, (debtors)
at the expense of another class (creditors), without adequately showing a
need for such protection. If the statute was designed to address excessive
jury awards, it is not tailored to that public policy concern because it allows
debtors to avoid paying just debts as well as unjust judgments. The weak-
ness of the public policy supporting the statute, as well as its failure to focus
the remedy on the stated concern, would most likely prove fatal to a de-
fense that the statute was a reasonable impairment.
C. EFFECT OFA SUCCESSFUL CONTRACT CLAUSE CLAlM
Even if a Contract Clause violation were found, the self-settled spend-
thrift trust statutes would not be struck down in their entirety. Presumably,
creditors with contractual rights that arose before enactment would be able
to reach the trust assets, but the statute's protection would apply and would
bar the claims of tort creditors and subsequent contract creditors. 83
The limited effect of a successful Contract Clause challenge is illus-
trated by Bailey v. State.2s4 In Bailey, the challenged statute put a $4000 cap
on the state income tax exemption for distributions from state and local
government pensions, where previously the exemption was unlimited.85
The legislature passed the law in response to a U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion 286 that required state tax treatment of federal employees to be equiva-
lent to the tax treatment of state and local government employees.287 The
legislature had set the $4000 cap to recoup the lost taxes when extending
278. Id. at 819.
279. See id. at 818 (noting that the statute contained "no emergency basis whatever").
280. Id.
281. Id. at 819.
282. Parsomese, 706 A-2d at 819.
283. The Contract Clause prohibits laws that affect existing contract rights; presumably
tort creditors and contract creditors whose claims arose after passage of a law would not be
protected by the Contract Clause.
284. 500 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 1998).
285. Id. at 59.
286. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
287. Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 59.
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the tax break to federal employees. 88 The court struck down the statute as
violating the Contract Clause, but restricted its holding to apply only "with
regard to employees whose benefits had vested when [the legislation] was,,289
passed. The court stated that the legislature could have made the cap
prospective only, and its holding, in essence, made the cap prospective.
290
Also, in Parsonese v. Midland National Insurance Co., the court held
that a statute revoking a beneficiary designation on divorce was unconstitu-
tional when applied retroactively, and it therefore refused to apply the stat-
ute retroactively. 292 The court, however, left the prospective application of
the statute intact.
293
Therefore, even if an existing contract creditor brought a successful
Contract Clause claim, that holding is likely to leave untouched the spend-
thrift protection against subsequent contract creditors and tort creditors.
However, the possibility of existing creditors reaching the assets may affect
whether the estate and gift tax benefits claimed for these trusts294 will be
available, at least in the near future.295
D. SUMMARY
A contract creditor whose claim against the debtor existed before
promulgation of the Alaska legislation could challenge a transfer of the
debtor's assets into an Alaska self-settled spendthrift trust on the grounds
that the legislation violated the Contract Clause. The creditor would have
to show that the legislation was a substantial impairment of the creditor's
contract with the debtor, and that the impairment was more than a mere
restriction on a remedy available to the creditor upon breach by the debtor.
The debtor may counter with the argument that the remaining remedies
under fraudulent conveyance statutes are still available to the creditor.
However, a fraudulent conveyance claim is difficult for a plaintiff to estab-
lish, and, if the transfer falls short of the definition of fraudulent convey-
ance, the legislation has harmed the creditor by giving the debtor a rela-
tively painless way to put assets beyond the reach of the creditor.
The defense that the impairment only applies to a contractual remedy
is a weak one that will fail if the impairment of the remedy essentially nulli-
fies the debtor's obligations under the contract. Assuming the contract
creditor can prove substantial impairment, it will be difficult for the debtor
to claim that the legislation is nevertheless constitutional under the reason-
288. Id. at 67.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 706 A.2d 814 (Pa. 1998).
292. Id. at 819.
293. Id. The court's approach was consistent with a Pennsylvania statute allowing sever-
ability of statutory provisions when necessary to salvage the remaining provisions. Id. at 814
(citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1925).
294. See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text (describing the estate tax benefit).
295. At some point in the future, however, the threat of creditors existing at the time the
legislation passed will no longer be realistic.
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ableness test of Spannaus and Blaisdell. The policy addressed by the legisla-
tion, presumably excessive tort judgments, is of limited concern, and the
remedy presented by the legislation is overbroad and of endless duration.
However, even if a contract creditor succeeds with a Contract Clause chal-
lenge, the statute would still be constitutional with respect to tort claimants
and contract creditors whose debts arose after enactment.
VI. E rATEAND GwrTAX ISSUES
One of the selling points of the Alaska trust is that, because of the
creditor protection, it will operate as an estate freeze device, thus "freezing"
the value of assets for estate tax purposes at their value at a time prior to
the taxpayer's death.296 The position that the trust provides an estate freeze
follows this reasoning: when a grantor places assets into an Alaska self-
settled spendthrift trust (which is irrevocable by definition) the transfer
could be treated as a completed gift for gift tax purposes because the
grantor has relinquished sufficient control over the trust assets. 297 The
value of the transfer for gift tax purposes will presumably be the entire
value of the trust corpus at the time of the gift.298 The grantor continues to
have use of the property, subject to the trustee's discretion. When the
grantor dies, and the assets pass to her heirs, the assets would not be in-
cluded in the grantor's estate because they had previously been gifted and
because the grantor had not retained sufficient power over the assets to
warrant inclusion under sections 2036 or 2038 of the Internal Revenue
Code ("I.1RC."). 299 Thus, all of the elements -of a classic freeze are present:
296. The concept of an estate freeze is as follows: the taxpayer wants to retain the benefits
of property but somehow freeze the value of the property so that future appreciation will not
be included in his taxable estate upon death. A classic freeze was the technique of retaining
preferred stock in a closely held company while transferring the common stock to the younger
generation. The estate freeze was severely limited by former section 2036(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, which was repealed retroactively and replaced with chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which contains a different set of limits on estate freezes. See generaUy JOHN R.
PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 2.44 (1992 & Supp. 1999).
297. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in 1983) (describing completed gift); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10, 1998) (finding private gift); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 13,
1993) (same).
298. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10, 1998) (disallowing deduction for grantor's
interest because it was impossible to value.) Also, depending on the identity of the other trust
beneficiaries, I.R.C. § 2702 may value the grantor's interest at zero. That section sets the
transferor's retained interest at zero value for gift tax purposes where the recipient of the
transferred interest is the transferor's spouse, the transferor's lineal descendants, the lineal
descendants of the transferor's spouse, and spouses of any such lineal descendants. I.R.C. §
2701(e)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
299. Generally, under section 2036, if a taxpayer gratuitously transfers property and re-
tains a life estate or the power to determine who will receive the income, the entire value of
the property will be included in the taxpayer's taxable estate, even though it is not owned by
the taxpayer at death. RIcHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
4.08, at 4-145 to 4-146 (7th ed. 1996) [hereinafter STEPHENS]. Property is includable in a
taxpayer's estate under section 2038, even if transferred by the taxpayer before death, if the
taxpayer retained the right to revoke the transfer or alter who has the right to enjoy the prop-
erty. Id. 4.10, at 4-197 to 4-200. Because there is a great deal of overlap in the property
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an early transfer of the assets with a gift tax cost of value at that time, con-
tinued use of the assets, and ultimate transfer of the assets to the heirs with
no tax on the post-gift appreciation.
Whether the grantor would be able to obtain this freeze is still unclear.
The IRS has issued a letter ruling 00 concluding that the establishment of
an Alaska trust is a completed gift, but two important conditions on that
ruling leave unanswered questions. The first is that the IRS based the ruling
on the assumption that creditors cannot reach the trust assets.3ml But as the
previous discussion illustrates,30 2 that assumption is not guaranteed. Pre-
sumably the only grantor that can be confident of the enforceability of the
spendthrift provisions is an Alaska grantor. Thus, the assertion that the
creditor protection written into the Alaskan statute obtains the tax benefits
begs the underlying question of whether the creditor protection will in fact
hold.
Second, the ruling expressly reserved the question of whether the trust
assets would be included in the trustor's estate when she died, even though
the transfer was a completed gift at the time of establishment of the trust. F0
The fact that the transfer was previously taxed as a completed gift does not
take it out of reach of the estate inclusion provisions, sections 2036 and
2038.304 The success of the spendthrift trust in tax planning depends on a
separate analysis under those sections because they apply different tests
than does section 2511, which determines whether the donor has relin-
quished sufficient control and interest to constitute a completed gift.
30 5
includable under the two sections, and because section 2036 is more inclusive and there is
more extensive authority under that section, the text primarily discusses inclusion under sec-
tion 2036.
300. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10, 1998).
301. Creditor protection is relevant to the tax issue because if the grantor's creditors can
reach an asset transferred by the grantor, then the grantor has de facto ownership because he
could borrow money and then allow creditors to reach the transferred money to satisfy his
debt. Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785, 814 (1986).
302. See supra Parts III-V (discussing a possible creditor attack on Alaska trusts).
303. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10, 1993).
304. For example, if a grantor established a trust with income payable to grantor for life,
remainder payable to niece on grantor's death, the transfer to the trust would be a completed
gift by grantor to niece of the remainder, and a gift tax return would be required. However,
when grantor died, the trust assets would be brought into grantor's estate under section 2036
because of the retained life interest. I.R.C. §§ 2511, 2036 (Vest Supp. 1999); see STEPHENS,
supra note 299, Vli 10.01[3][b], 4.08 (explaining that a remainder causes assets to revert to the
grantor's estate).
305. Professor Pennell stated:
Even the statement of that result [a completed gift of the property will keep
it out of donor's estate] suggests that it is the wrong conclusion under cur-
rent law, and case law looking to the rights of creditors may be unreliable
because the creditor test is merely a surrogate for a more precise articula-
tion of the degree of enjoyment that must be retained before section
2036(a)(1) is triggered.
Pennell, supra note 16, § 4.2. See also Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941),
which is cited in a tax analysis article at the Alasla Trust Company website for support that the
trust tax planning will work. Alaska Trust Comnpany's Gift & Estate Tax Analysis ofAlaska Self-seted
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Section 2036(a) requires inclusion of assets in a person's estate if the
person transferred the assets during life but retained "the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or... the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the per-
sons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom."3 6
The second clause is not applicable, assuming that the trust was properly
drafted so that only the trustee has the power to designate who shall enjoy
the property. The issue is whether the grantor's status as a discretionary
beneficiary, with spendthrift protection, is equivalent to retention of the
enjoyment of the property.
There are two tests under which the grantor's beneficiary status would
be treated as enjoyment of the property and, therefore, cause the trust as-
sets to be. included in the grantor's estate. First, case law and IRS rulings
hold that where the grantor's creditors can reach the trust assets, then the
grantor has retained enjoyment of the property within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 2036(a).307 Second, the regulations issued under section 2036 state
that where a grantor has transferred assets to an independent trustee, and
the trustee has the discretionary power but no obligation to make distribu-
tions to the grantor, the grantor's interest will cause the trust to be included
in his estate if there is an express or implied understanding with the trustee
that the grantor can have access to the funds in the trust. 0
Before the Alaska and Delaware statutes were passed, the estate freeze
was not considered available for trusts in which the grantor retained a dis-
cretionary interest. That was so because the grantor's creditors could most
likely reach the assets under state law, and, therefore, the IRS would hold
the assets includable in the taxable estate under the first theory.3 0 Analysis
of the applicability of section 2036(a) to an Alaska trust would start with
application of the creditor accessibility test. As noted above,310 some ave-
nues for certain creditors to reach the trust assets exist, in spite of the
Spendthrift Trusts (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http:/vww.alaskatrust.com/homepg2.html>. That
case, however, addressed only the issue of whether the establishment of the trust was a com-
pleted gift.
306. 1.RLC. § 2036(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
307. See, e.g., Paxton, 86 T.C. at 814; Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 153, 162 (1981),
acq. in result 1981-2 C.B. 2; Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293. As Professor Pennell explains:
And while one theory underlying the creditor reach standard for applying
section 2036(a)(1) was that a settlor could indirectly enjoy trust assets by
running up credit that would be satisfied from the trust, the more precise
articulation of the rationale for inclusion is that this ability to relegate
creditors to trust assets is a section 2038(a)(1) power to indirectly revoke the
trust.
Pennell, supra note 16, § 4.2. See generally supra note 299 (describing the effects of sections
2036 and 2038).
308. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 1961).
309. See Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293 (holding that a grantor's trust assets are in-
cluded in his gross estate when the trust is discretionary); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-37-116 (June 23,
1980) (holding that the grantor's trust assets are includable when the grantor has retained the
right to designate benificiaries); Pennell, supra note 16, § 4.2 (describing creditor access rule).
310. See supra Parts Il-V (discussing possible creditor attacks on Alaska trusts).
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statutory protection. However, shether this would be sufficient to support a
holding that such limited creditor access was tantamount to retaining en-
joyment of the assets is unclear.
If, upon the death of the grantor, a court determines that creditor ac-
cess was sufficiently limited so that the first test of creditor access under
section 2036 does not cause the trust assets to be included in the estate, the
court could then turn to the second test: whether an implied understanding
of grantor access nevertheless existed. A retained interest can trigger I.R.C.
§ 2036 inclusion, even if it is not legally enforceable, if the understanding
that the grantor retains enjoyment of the property can be inferred from the
circumstances.1 Cases finding an implied understanding illustrate the
flexibility courts will have in determining whether an Alaska trust should be
included in the grantor's estate.
3 12
In Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner,313 for example, the grantor had
placed virtually all of his assets, including his household furnishings, into a
trust, naming his son as primary trustee and his other children as backt-up
trustees.3 1 4 He withheld from the trust, however, certain patent royalty
payments that provided significant income at the time,315 but would cease
less than ten years after he established the trust.31 6 The trust instrument
gave the trustee full discretion over distributions of principal and income.
The court found that the following circumstances established the existence
of an understanding that the grantor in fact retained enjoyment of the
property:
(1) when the trust was set up, the grantor did not file a gift tax
return, instead taking the position that his retained interest in the
trust was consideration for the transfer of property into the trust,
and, thus, it was not a gift;
(2) the grantor had transferred everything he owned into the
trust, other than the royalty payments, which were due to expire
when grantor would have been 64 years old, and it was unlikely
that the grantor would have left himself destitute at that point in
his life;
(3) the grantor made no provision for his wife other than the
trust and would not have left her destitute on his death;
(4) distributions from the trust to grantor's wife after grantor's
death increased dramatically;
(5) the interests in the trust that the grantor retained passed to
his children-who were the natural objects of his bounty-on his
death, and distributions to the children increased after the gran-
311. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 1961); Paxton, 86T.C. at 810 (1986).
312. It is useful to review the factual circumstances of such cases lecause the finding of an
implied understanding is always based on the particular facts.
313. 86T.C. 785 (1986).
314. Id. at810.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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tor's death; and
(6) the trustee was the grantor's son, and the two had a very
close relationship.
317
Because of the implied understanding that the taxpayer would continue to
have use of trust assets, the court held that the trust assets were includable
in his taxable estate at his death.
Estate ofMcCabe v. United States3 18 is another example of factual circum-
stances indicating an implied understanding that the grantor could con-
tinue to rely on the trust funds for support. In McCabe, the grantor set up a
trust in 1940 which provided that the grantor's wife was to receive the trust
income for life, with the remainder going to his children upon his wife's
death.3 19 The trustee had the discretion to invade the trust principal for the
benefit of the grantor's wife if she had medical needs or other
emergencies. 20 The trustee made no distributions until the grantor
retired.321 During the five years between the grantor's retirement and his
death, the trustee distributed trust principal to the grantor four times, each
time following receipt of letters from the grantor's wife requesting that
principal be distributed. 22 The trustee was also the grantor's longtime
friend. 23 The Court of Claims held that these circumstances indicated an
understanding that the trustee would invade the principal for the benefit of
the grantor when the grantor's cash needs arose upon retirement.3 24 That
understanding was sufficient to include the trust assets in the estate of the
grantor under I.R.C. § 2036(a).3 25
Likewise, in Estate of Green v. Commissioner,26 the taxpayer transferred
more than $700,000, the bulk of her assets, to an irrevocable trust, naming
a bank as trustee. 27 The trustee had discretion to distribute so much of the
income and corpus, up to $25,000 a year, as the trustee deemed necessary
for the trustor's "health, welfare and happiness."3 28 When the trustor estab-
lished the trust, her son-in-law made the arrangements with the bank, and
the son-in-law and the bank personnel agreed that the trusior would re-
ceive quarterly distributions of $6000.329 The trust further provided that,
upon the trustor's death, the trust assets would be distributed to her de-
scendants. 30 The court held that the trust assets were to be included in her
317. Id. at 812-13.
318. 475 F.2d 1142 (Ct. C1. 1973).
319. Id. at 1144.
320. Id. at 1144-45 n.1.
321. Id. at 1147.
322. Id.
323. McCabe, 475 F.2d at 1146.
324. Id. at 1147.
325. Id. at 1148.
326. 64 T.C. 1049 (1975).
327. Id. at 1050.
328. Id. at 1059.
329. Id. at 1052.
330. Id. at 1051.
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estate under section 2036.31 The fact that she placed the majority of her
assets in the trust made it "highly unlikely that she would have done so
without some understanding that she would receive. . .[regular distribu-
tions]." s 2 Also supporting the inference of an implied understanding was
the fact that the trustor received all of the income from the trust until her
death.33
Finally, Estate of Skinner v. United States3 34 illustrates how little is re-
quired to find an implied arrangement. The trustor in that case set up an
irrevocable trust, providing for discretionary payments of income to trustor
and other family members.335 The trustor also had the power to appoint
successors to the individual and corporate, trustees if there was a vacancy.
36
From the time the trustor established the trust until trustor's death, she
received all the income from the trust.,3 7 The court held that the actual
receipt of all the income, coupled with the fact that the trustor filed a gift
tax return when she set up the trust, showing a deduction for the value of
338her life estate, was sufficient evidence of a prearrangement. The court
acknowledged that this holding set up a stringent test for a settlor of a dis-
cretionary trust to exclude the trust assets from his estate if he has in fact
received all of the income.339 The court went on to state, however, that
"every case of this sort must stand on its own facts and that the practice of
assuming that a trustee, corporate or otherwise, is necessarily independent
of the cestui whom he represents, need not be followed invariably but may
be rebutted by circumstances.
" 340
Thus, Skinner, as well as Paxton, McCabe, and Green, demonstrates that
courts find implied understandings by examining how much of the trustor's
property is placed in the trust, the extent and regularity of distributions to
the trustor after the trust is established, the relationship between the trustor
331. Green, 64 T.C. at 1063-64.
332. Id. at 1062.
333. Id. The court also found another ground for inclusion: The words used to limit the
trustee's discretion, i.e., that he was to make distributions as it deemed necessary for her hap-
piness, was tantamount to the trustor retaining a right to the income because the trustor was
the only one who could say what was needed for her happiness. To refuse a request for funds
from the trustor would have therefore been a breach of trust. The trust assets were therefore
includible under the first clause of section 2036(a)(1), including assets in which the decedent
retained "the right to income." Id. at 1059.
334. 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.1963).
335. Id. at519.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. Ironically, the deduction for the life estate was successfiuly challenged by the gov-
ernment when the gift tax return was audited. Id. Therefore, the trustor was subjected to gift
tax for the entire amount at the time the trust was established. The value of the trust as of date
of death was also later brought into her estate for estate tax purposes. The government's posi-
tion regarding the gift tax return, that the life estate was worthless because of the trustee's
discretionary power over distributions, was considered "of but little weight" by the court when
later considering estate inclusion. Id. at 520.
339. Skinner, 316 F.2d at 520.
340. Id.
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and trustee, and statements or other actions implying the trustor's contin-
ued relaince on support from the trust.
However, some taxpayers have had success in excluding self-settled
trusts from their estate. In Estate of Uhl v. Commissioner,341 the taxpayer's
estate conceded that the portion of a trust set up by the taxpayer would be
included in his estate because the trust mandated a $100 monthly payment
to the taxpayer. 42 However, the estate argued that the trust principal in
excess of the amount needed to support the required monthly payment
should be excluded from the taxable estate, even though the trustee had
discretion to distribute more than the required $100 per month.m3 The IRS
countered that the entire trust corpus was includible under section
2036(a)(1) because, under state law, the taxpayer's creditors were able to
reach the entire trust corpus.34 The Seventh Circuit interpreted Indiana
state law and held that it was unclear whether creditors could reach the
entire corpus, and that the IRS's argument was therefore insufficient to
trigger section 2036(a)(1). 345 The court did not discuss, and apparently the
government did not argue, the second test-whether there was an under-
standing that more than the monthly $100 would be available to the tax-
payer s46 Even though Uhl is an example of the trust being excluded from
the estate, it is not helpful in defending against an implied understanding
theory of estate inclusion.
Estate of German v. United StatesM? was another estate inclusion case,
where the court refused to bring the trust assets back into the taxpayer's
estate under section 2036.48 In that case, the trustor set up six separate
trusts, naming her two sons as cotrustees.349 Three of the trusts were for the
benefit of one son, and the other three were for the benefit of the other
son. 350 Each trust agreement provided that the assets were to accumulate
during the lifetime of the trustor, and, after her death, -each agreement
allowed discretionary distributions to the son who was the beneficiary of the
trust.351 On the death of a son, the assets remaining in the trusts were to be
payable to family members appointed by that son.3 52 Under each trust
agreement, the trustees had authority to make distributions from the trust
to the trustor, provided that the son who was the beneficiary of the trust
341. 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
342. Id. at 868.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 870.
345. Id. at 870-71.
346. It should also be noted that the Skinner court did not find Uhl supportive of the tax-
payer's argument because, in Uhl, the trustor only received discretionary distributions in two
of the eight years that the trust existed before trustor's death. By contrast, in Skinner, the
trustor received all the income every year until her death. Skinner, 316 F.2d at 519, 520 n.3.
347. 7 Cl. Ct. 641 (1985).
348. Id. at 645.
349. Id. at 642.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. German, 7 Cl. Ct. at 643.
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gave prior written consent to the distribution. 53 As in Uhl, the government
argued that under Maryland law, the trustor's creditors could reach the
trust, and, therefore, the trust assets should be includable in her estate un-
der section 2 0 3 6 .35 Based on the government's position, the court stated:
"[tlhus, the narrow issue to be decided herein is as to the extent of dece-
dent's creditors' rights with respect to the trust income and assets under
Maryland law."355 After finding that the case at hand was distinguishable
from Maryland case law allowing creditors access to trust assets, the court
held that the government did not establish that creditors could have
reached the trust assets.3 56 Similar to Ul, the court did not discuss, and
apparently the government did not argue, the alternative ground for inclu-
sion: whether there was an implied understanding that the trustor would
receive assets under the discretionary power held by her trustees and sub-
ject to the consent of the ultimate beneficiaries. 57 Even though Uhl and
German were taxpayer victories with trusts similar to the Alaska trusts, the
incomplete analysis in those cases undercuts their use as authority for sup-
porting the tax freeze benefits of the Alaska trust.
Estate of Wells v. Commissioner,3 58 however, is a case where the court re-
lied on the facts to find there was no implied understanding. 59 The gov-
ernment argued that there was an agreement with the trustee that the
trustor would have access to the trust funds.' 60 The Tax Court held that
there was no evidence of such an implied agreement.361 First, the trustor
had approached her accountant about making gifts to her grandchildren,
but she expressed concern about the effect on her cash flow if she made the
gifts. 62 The accountant prepared a cash flow analysis which showed that
even if she made the gifts, her income would remain at an acceptable level
because of the recent sale of some property. 363 The accountant advised her
to put the funds in trust for her minor grandchildren, but also encouraged
her to name her son as trustee, and allow him to make discretionary distri-
butions to her in the event of some "medical tragedy."364 The son in fact
made regular distributions to the trustor because he wanted to encourage
his mother to travel.3 65 These facts indicated to the court that the trustor's
intention was to make gifts to grandchildren, and that she had no expecta-
tion that she would continue to receive benefits from the assets transferred
353. Id.
354. Id. at 643.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 645.
357. German, 7 C1. Ct. at 645.
358. 42T.C.M. (CCH) 1305 (1981).
359. Id. at 1310.
360. Id. at 1306.
361. Id. at 1310.
362. Id. at 1305.
363. Wells, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1306.
364. Id. at 1306.
365. Id.
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into the trusts 66 Therefore, a showing of adequate resources retained out-
side the trust, the intention of the grantor not to rely on the trust assets,
and modes of distribution from the trust defeated the argument of an im-
plied agreement.
Conversely, facts indicating that a primary purpose of the trust was to
protect the assets from creditors may be read as evidence of agreement. In
Estate of Hendry v. Commissioner,3 67 the taxpayer had transferred a farm to
his wife, but continued to operate the farming business and commingled
the proceeds of that business with his personal assets until his death3bs In
support of its holding that there was an implied understanding that the
decedent would retain benefits from the farm, and that the farm was
therefore includible in his estate under section 2036, the court noted that
the decedent's wife testified that he had made the transfer because he "was
in a high-risk business, and, therefore.., he wanted to insure that his wife
and children would have some security." 369 Contrast this with the expressed
intention of the decedent in Estate of Wells v. Commissioner to make gifts to
her grandchildren. 370 Intent of the trustor is therefore a factor indicative of
whether there was an understanding.
While a trustor of an Alaska trust would be well advised to make a rec-
ord of intent that appears more consistent with Wells than Hendry, the size
of the transfer relative to the trustor's other assets, the trustor's occupation,
and the trustor's concern about creditors may contradict expressed in-
tentions for making gifts to the other trust beneficiaries. Also, even if a
factors analysis is inconclusive in finding an implied understanding, a court
could still find an understanding based on evidence that that the trustee
would be likely to respond to trustor's requests or needs. In Estate of Kerdolff
v. Commissioner,372 the taxpayer had transferred her home to her children
but continued to live there. 7 Even though there were some circumstances
refuting an understanding that the mother could continue to have use of
the home, the daughter admitted in testimony that "[w]e weren't going to
kick her out. '374 That admission, coupled with the court's conclusion that it
would be difficult to actually move the mother out of the family home be-
cause it would be a "drastic emotional and personal change," 375 was suffi-
cient to find an understanding and include the residence in the mother's
366. Id. at 1310.
367. 62 T.C. 861 (1974).
368. Id. at 864.
369. Id. at 875. Another notable aspect of Hendy is that the court put the burden on the
taxpayer of proving that an implied understanding did not exist because the facts of the case
implied a prearrangement.
370. Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305 (1981). See supra notes 367-
69 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
371. For example, if the trustor was a high net-worth individual, she may have concerns
about being a target for litigation.
372. 57 T.C. 643 (1972).
373. Id. at 645-46.
374. Id. at 649.
375. Id. at 650.
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estate under section 2036.76 Similarly, although the personal and emo-
tional dynamics connected with a home, and with a mother and her chil-
dren, would not be present with an Alaska trust, a court may consider the
natural inclination of the corporate trustee to provide for the grantor when
requested to do so. Quite simply, if the trustee was restrictive in responding
to requests for funds for the grantor, that may then discourage future
grantors.
Two letter rulings indicate that the IRS accepts, to some extent, the
general proposition that section 2036 should not bring a trust back into the
grantor's estate where the grantor retains an interest as a discretionary
beneficiary. In Private Letter Ruling 80-37-116, the IRS ruled that a trust
set up by a nonresident alien, in which the trustee had discretion to distrib-
ute principal and income to the nonresident alien grantor and other family
members who were beneficiaries, was not includible in the assets subject to
U.S. estate tax on the grantor's death.77 Section 2104(b) includes any assets
transferred by a nonresident alien that would fall within sections 2035
through 2038, if the assets were situated in the United States at time of
transfer.378 The IRS found that the trust did not come within section 2036,
because Herzog v. Commissioner,7 9 which was decided by the court in the
same circuit as the location of the trust at issue, held that discretionary
beneficiary status was "a hope or passive expectancy rather than a right" to
enjoyment of the property Herzog was a gift tax case, however, and the
private letter ruling made no mention of the creditor access issue or the
implied understanding issue.381 Also, the ruling noted that the trustee had
made no distributions from the trust to the grantor.8 2
Similarily, in Private Letter Ruling 93-32-006,383 two siblings had es-
tablished offshore trusts. They requested a ruling on whether the transfers
to the trusts were completed gifts and whether the trust assets would be
includable in their estates under sections 2036 or 2 03 8 .3 4 The IRS ruled
that the siblings had relinquished sufficient control to make completed
gifts.38 5 Furthermore, the IRS stated that the trust property would not be
included in either settlor's estate under sections 2036, 2037, or 2038 be-
cause "under the facts presented, the Trustee's discretion to make distribu-
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Nonresident aliens are subject to U.S. estate tax to the extent that their assets are
situated in the United States as of the time of death. I.R.C. § 2101 (West Supp. 1999).
379. 116F.2d591 (2dCir. 1941).
380. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-37-116 (June 23, 1980). Also, the Service held that the interest as a
discretionary beneficiary would not be considered a reversionary interest that would trigger
section 2037. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 20, 1992).
384. Id.
385. Id. The Service also cited Rev. Rul. 76-103, which concluded that if a gift was incom-
plete because of the extent of retained rights in the property, the transferred property would
be includible in the taxable estate under section 2038. Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293, 294.
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tions to a Settlor is not a retained interest or power for purposes of those
sections. '3s6 It is surprising that the IRS would be willing to make a pro-
spective ruling on the estate inclusion issue without analysis of actual distri-
butions to the settlors prior to their deaths.387 There was the usual dis-
claimer at the end of the ruling, however, that "no opinion is expressed
about the tax treatment of. . .any conditions existing at the time of, or
effects resulting from, the proposed transaction that are not specifically
covered by the above rulings."
3
In summary, the estate freeze advantage of the self-settled spendthrift
trust is not guaranteed. Although the IRS has recognized that establishing
such a trust can be a completed gift for gift tax purposes, it may still claim
that the trust assets should be included in the trustor's estate at the date-of-
death value. The trust assets could be included under a theory that, despite
Alaska law, the assets were still subject to the trustor's creditors under the
various means of attack described in Parts III through V of this Article. In
the alternative, the assets could be included if a court finds that there was
an implied understanding that the trustor would continue to enjoy the
benefits of the trust assets. Facts supporting the finding of such an under-
standing could be showings of intent at the time the trust was set up, the
extent of the trustor's assets placed in the trust, and the history of distribu-
tions to the trustor after the trust was established. Since the existence of an
understanding that the trustor has access to the trust is determined on a
case-by-case basis, there is certainly the undesirable prospect of engaging in
litigation against the IRS. Whether the taxpayer -will be successful in that
litigation will depend in part on the facts of the case as well as the possibil-
ity that the court would conclude that this type of trust necessarily includes
an understanding that the trustor retains enjoyment of the property.
VII. POLICY DISCUSSION
The question remains whether courts should ever allow the self-settled
spendthrift trust. The supporters of these trusts offer a number ofjustifica-
tions, including protection from excessive tort judgments and equity for
self-made millionaires who have no wealthy relatives to set up a spendthrift
trust for them. However, the validity of these trusts should be denied for
several reasons. First, there are the moral concerns: a person should be
held to her promises, should be required to repay just debts, and should
not be able to avoid paying debts while still enjoying the use of her assets.389
Next, there is the practical concern of the effect this device may have on the
386. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 20, 1992).
387. The Service was not so generous in its recent ruling on the taxability of an Alaska
trust. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-003 (June 10, 1998) (withholding a ruling on whether the trust
assets would be included in the grantor's estate).
388. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-006 (Aug. 20, 1992).
389. While there are many ways that our legal system allows just that, such as exemptions
for retirement assets, those exemptions are in place for other, countervailing reasons. On the
other hand, the system also extends liability to assets that the debtor has passed beyond her
control, as in the case of fraudulent transfers and bankruptcy preferences.
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integrity of our legal and economic system. Finally, the arguments favoring
the self-settled spendthrift trust are merely justifications for its existence
and do not offer compelling reasons to override the policy concerns on the
other side of the debate. For example, the primary argument offered in
defense of self-settled spendthrift trusts is the overactive tort system. That
argument seems pretextual, however, because excesses should be addressed
within the tort system itself, rather than providing an escape route from the
entire system.
A. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
The position that self-settled spendthrift trusts are a desirable exten-
sion of trust law draws both from the traditional arguments supporting
third-party spendthrift trusts generally, as well as from arguments focused
on the benefits of the self-settled creditor protection. As for the traditional
arguments, the argument often given as the primary support for spend-
thrift trusts does not aid the self-settled trust. This argument was based on
general property rights and the notion that donors should be able to re-
strict a gift in whatever way they saw fit, including a restriction on access to
the beneficiary's interest by her creditors and assignees.3s 0 That argument
obviously offers no support for the extension of protection to the self-
settled spendthrift trust because the protection from the grantor's creditors
resulting from a self-settled trust involves no gift to a third person. Addi-
tionally, the grantor's rights in her own property would not normally in-
clude the power to set that property beyond the reach of creditors.
Another one of the original arguments, used by Justice Miller in his
now-famous dicta in Nichols v. Eaton,s91 is more helpful to the cause of self-
settled spendthrift trusts. This argument states that that spendthrift trusts
are no different than creditor protection provided by exemption laws such
as homestead. 92 Professor Hirsch notes that an individual can already
protect himself from creditors by putting assets into exempt form, such as
ERISA-governed retirement accounts, life insurance,3 and residences
390. See GRISWOLD, supra note 24, § 552 (stating that a person who owns property may
give as he pleases); George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts WMich are Miscalled "Spend-
thrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAL. L REV. 471, 483 (1932) (same). Dean Griswold argued that
this justification is insufficient because property ownership does not carry an unqualified right
to dispose of it in any way. GRISWOLD, supra note 24, § 554. "If such trusts are valid it is not
because the owner of property may dispose of it as he sees fit, but because the particular re-
striction in question is not contrary to public policy." Costigan, supra, at 467. Professor Costi-
gan called the reliance on this argument "unfortunate" because it allowed for an unlimited
spendthrift protection. Id. at 483.
391. 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
392. See id. at 726 (stating that in some jurisdictions the homestead, inter alia, is ex-
empted).
393. 26 U.S.CA. § 401(a)(13) (West Supp. 1999); 26 C.F.R. 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1999). Cf.
Patterson v. Schumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992) (noting that ERISA protection qualifies as
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" extending spendthrift protection under 11.U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)
so that assets subject to that spendthrift protection were excluded from the bankruptcy estate).
In some states, retirement assets not governed by ERISA, such as individual retirement ac-
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protected by homestead laws. 95 Professor Hirsch therefore questions
whether there is a substantive difference in allowing a person to protect
assets by placing them in trust.396
Professor Costigan supported the third-party spendthrift trust on the
ground that objections focus on protecting the hapless creditor, while, in
his opinion, "[tihe hard-hearted creditor, it is quite safe to assert, has been
more ubiquitous and more pernicious than the unscrupulous debtor."3 97 It
is hard to argue with that statement, but, particularly if used to justify self-
settled spendthrift trusts, it seems excessive to give all debtors, both un-
scrupulous and well-meaning, a means by which to thwart the "hard-
hearted" creditor in pursuit of that well-meaning debtor.
Professor Hirsch identified several functions served by spendthrift
trusts. s98 These include the protective (or paternal) function and the social-
izing function, which can be summarized as follows. The spendthrift trust
gives parents a way to protect their children and help overspending chil-
dren without either giving them more than their fair share of the family
wealth or overly restricting their fair share. 9 9 In addition, restraints on
involuntary alienation serve a security function, protecting the beneficiary
from future financial reversals, 4°° and a value maintenance function, be-
cause the restrictions on the assets cause them to be undervalued by third
parties looking for reimbursement. 40 1 The protective and socializing func-
tions do not support self-settled spendthrift trusts, but the security and
value maintenance functions are presumably the primary reasons grantors
would choose such a trust.40 2 A good example is the well-meaning grantor
who is setting up a self-settled spendthrift trust with a reasonable percent-
age (rather than all) of her assets in order to have a "rainy day fund" if she
is ever sued in her professional or personal capacity. This is the most justi-
fiable use of the self-settled spendthrift trust: the grantor who retains assets
outside of the trust, continues to maintain liability insurance, and does not
intend to defraud her creditors, but seeks only to have some funds to live
on. The problem with this justification for the self-settled spendthrift trust
is that the statutes do not, and cannot, distinguish between the responsible
counts, are also exempt from creditor claims. For an example, see WASH. REV. CODE §
6.15.020 (1998).
394. See generally William A. Brackney, Creditors' Rights in Life Insurance, PROB. & PROP. 52
(1993) (describing exemptions from creditor claims for life insurance proceeds).
395. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (providing unlimited homestead exemption).
396. AdamJ. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives,
73 WASH. U.LQ. 1, 91 (1996).
397. Costigan, supra note 390, at 476-77.
398. Hirsch, supra note 396, at 41-42.
399. Id.
400. See id. at 57 ("By squirrelling away this nest egg, benefactors give beneficiaries a
measure of protection against future financial embarrassment....").
401. See id. at 58-59 (explaining how restraints on alienation guard against disadvanta-
geousjudicial sales of property).
402. Another potential motivation would be to achieve the tax savings discussed supra Part
VI.
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and the unscrupulous grantor; they extend protection to both.
In addition to the arguments supporting spendthrift trusts in general,
there are independent arguments supporting the extension of the spend-
thrift protection to self-settled trusts. In Professor Costigan's reply to Pro-
fessor Gray's objections to the spendthrift trust, he provided an argument
in favor of allowing at least a limited use of self-settled spendthrift trusts:
And that brings us, at last, to the problem of the man who realizes
that he is a spendthrift and who tries to protect himself from ul-
timately becoming dependent on charity or on the public for
support by creating for himself a spendthrift trust. If there is
anything in the argument that the beneficiary's need should affect
the attitude of the court, then such a beneficiary's need should be
met, provided there is no fraud on his existing creditors, that is,
provided that he keeps out of the trust assets sufficient to dis-
charge his existing debts. No doubt there is, on the one hand, a
danger of defrauding future creditors that must be guarded
against; but that is wholly a problem of intent, which may be as-
certained, and we are assuming an intent that is legitimate. On
the other hand, after the recent experiences of the United States
with so-called high powered salesmanship, there seems clearly to
be a grave need that society shall protect those persons who are
unable to guard themselves against objectionable importunity and
against being thrown to the wolves that infest our society. Never-
theless, since they themselves provide the property to be used for
their own reasonable support, free from the claims of the future
creditors, and since their protection against such creditors is to be
justified only to the extent that sound public policy dictates, it
would seem only fair to make each trustor-beneficiary demon-
strate his peculiar need for protection-his actual and not merely
possible inability to fend off the human vultures seeking to gorge
upon his substance. In addition it may be proper to require him,
through recorded notices of the trust and through information
supplied to commercial agencies and other bodies which furnish
credit reports to business people, to spread the news of his self
established spendthrift trust so as to put reasonable cautious fu-
ture creditors on their guard.403
There is also the issue of the inequity of the bar against self-settled
spendthrift trusts when third-party spendthrift trusts are allowed. A person
with wealthy relatives can enjoy a spendthrift trust fund that can never be
depleted by her debts, but a person who accumulates her wealth by her own
efforts is unable to create such an exempt fund with her own assets. Dean
403. Costigan, supra note 390, at 491-92. Similar arguments have been made in support of
the federal bankruptcy statutes, referring to unscrupulous credit card companies that extend
credit to persons for whom repayment will dearly be a hardship, if not impossible. See Hon.
Leif M. Clark, Caging Credit Card Lenders toAccount, 1998 AM. BANKR. LJ. 181.
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Griswold was troubled by this: "Why should a person be allowed to live debt
free on the bounty of others while property which he has accumulated by
his own effort is denied the same immunity? ''404 The inequity becomes even
more troubling when one considers that Alaska and Delaware, as well as
several other states, 405 have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities, thus
allowing many future generations to take advantage of creditor-exempt
wealth.
A more contemporary commentator has stated that the bar on self-
settled trusts "makes no sense. 40 6 Professor Hirsch analogizes the self-
settled spendthrift trust to a transfer to a third person.40 7 He argues that
the creditor's concern with the possibility of the debtor transferring assets
to a self-settled spendthrift trust is essentially the same as the risk that the
debtor will transfer to a third party.408 Therefore, the introduction of self-
settled spendthrift trusts has not increased the creditors' burden and
should be addressed in the same manner as third-party transfers-with
fraudulent conveyance statutes and contract provisions. 409 He further ar-
gues that the benefits of self-settled spendthrift trusts-which serve the self-
paternalism function, value maintenance function, and security function-
support their acceptance.410
Scholars have also argued that self-settled trusts do not harm creditors
since the transfer could be unwound if done to defraud existing
creditors, 41' and future contract creditors would then have notice of the
trust and the limitations on the grantor's assets available to satisfy the
debt.41 2 Notice of the spendthrift trust would forewarn the creditor to pro-
tect itself by obtaining additional security, limit the credit extended, or
include protective contract terms.
Finally, the argument advanced in support of the new wave of domes-
tic asset protection trusts is the threat of litigation. The legislation's sup-
porters claim that the self-settled spendthrift trust is a response to the
problem of a runaway tort system.4 s They argue that society as a whole
benefits from their availability because without such trusts, there are "0b-
404. GRiswoLD, supra note 24, § 557, at 475. But Griswold also thought that any such
spendthrift protection for the settlor should be limited in amount. Id. at 476.
405. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 117, at 854 (listing states that have abol-
ished the Rule Against Perpetuities).
406. Hirsch, supra note 396, at 83.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 84-86.
410. Id. at 89-90; see also supra notes 398-402 and accompanying text (describing Professor
Hirsch's definitions of these functions).
411. See supra notes 36-70 and accompanying text (describing Alaska's and other states'
fraudulent conveyance exceptions to self-settled spendthrift trust protection).
412. See Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875) (noting that trust instruments are avail-
able for public inspection); Hirsch, supra note 396, at 64-65 (arguing that the criticism of
spendthrift trusts that they harm creditors is a "red herring").
413. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 144, at 794 (noting the comments of Mr. Barry
Engel).
1255
85 IOWA LAW REVIEW
stetricians who are no longer practicing... 0 people who are hesitant to go
into business in certain areas," and, as a result, there is a "huge cost" to all
of us.
4 14
In sum, the self-settled spendthrift trust can be viewed as a necessary
protection against the threat of unjustified and excessive tort judgments
and the actions of other predatory creditors. It can also be viewed as an
equalizing measure to allow the self-made millionaire the same protection
from creditors that the beneficiary of inherited wealth can enjoy.
B. RESPONSES TO THEARGUMENTS FAVORING SELF-SETLED SPENDTHRIFT
TRUSTS
The argument that self-settled trusts are akin to other creditor protec-
tion provisions, such as homestead laws and exemption of retirement as-
sets, fails to address the significant risk-shifting available with a self-settled
trust. While it is true that there are significant opportunities to protect as-
sets through use of pension accounts, life insurance, and expensive homes,
there are certain limitations on those forms of assets that normally prevent
individuals from easily converting all of their assets into those forms.
4 15
Moreover, even with a bankruptcy discharge, the effect on an individual's
future creditworthiness is a significant deterrent.
With a self-settled trust, however, there are almost no limitations. Al-
though the trustor must turn irrevocable control over to the independent
trustee and pay a fee for such services, there are no legal limitations on the
amount the trustee can distribute for the benefit of the grantor. Presuma-
bly, the corporate trustee will want to accommodate its customer, the set-
tlor, in order to encourage future business. Also, the assets in the trust can
remain liquid, and therefore readily available, at the trustee's discretion.
Investment decisions regarding the trust assets are relatively unrestricted.
An existing creditor is therefore deprived of the benefit of relying on the
debtor's self-interest to maintain his own assets. Although it is true that if
the transfer falls within the applicable definition of fraudulent transfer,
then the creditor will be able to access the trust assets, Alaska defines
"fraudulent transfer" very narrowly. Furthermore, even with the broader
definition from other states, a disadvantaged creditor may still fall outside
the statutory protection. In other words, the self-settled trust offers such
little risk to the grantor, and allows him to retain so much control, that it
removes ordinary disincentives to asset protection that existing law has
presumed. As noted by Professor Dobris, "who would not want to spend-
thrift his own assets? If it works, then, among settlors who fear their credi-
414. Id.
415. For example, the annual contributions to qualified retirement accounts and IRAs are
limited. I.R.C. § 415 (West. Supp. 1999). The purpose of those limitations is to limit the in-
come tax breaks on retirement savings, rather than to reign in creditor protection, however.
With respect to the unlimited homestead exemption as a method of sheltering assets, it re-
quires the debtor to invest solely in one parcel of real estate, losing the advantages of liquidity
and diversification.
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tors, the only people who will choose not to spendthrift their own assets, are
those who are afraid no one will do business with them or loan them money
ever again.
Another commentator answers the exempt property analogy by
pointing out that the purpose of the exemption statutes is to protect the
debtor and the debtor's family from absolute poverty, while still allowing
some relief for creditors.4 7 This echoes the concerns of Dean Griswold and
Professor Costigan, that even third-party spendthrift trust protection
should be limited to reasonable support.4 18 As further recognition of the
policy that there should be limits on exempt property, Congress has pro-
posed amending the federal bankruptcy law to cap the amount of allowable
homestead exemption, overriding the state law on the question.419
With respect to the need for protection from the ruthless creditor, the
remedy of the self-settled spendthrift trust is both overbroad and underin-
dusive. The self-settled spendthrift trust is unlikely to be used by working
class people who develop financial difficulties as a result of easy credit of-
fered by overly aggressive lenders. It is equally likely to be used by the more
sophisticated debtor to avoid just, as well as unjust, debts.
The argument that prohibition of the self-settled spendthrift trust is
unfair to the person who earned his own wealth is a valid point. However,
inherited wealth carries with it many advantages, of which permissible
spendthrift protection is only one.420 To extend spendthrift protection to
one's own earnings violates the same principle as if creditor exemption of
life insurance and retirement accounts were extended to any asset. If the
legal system makes it too easy to avoid liability, then the civil enforcement
system, which supposedly is an incentive to obey the rules, would be in
jeopardy.421
The argument that the creditor is not harmed by a self-settled spend-
416. Joel Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We
Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L REV. 543, 573 (1998).
417. See Willard M. Bushman, The (In)validity of Spendthift Trusts, 47 OR. L REv. 304, 312
(1968) (stating that exemption laws strengthen the integrity of the debtor).
418. GRisWOLD, supra note 24, § 565; Costigan,supra note 390, at 492.
419. See GAO Finds Some Florida and Texas Debtors Have Expensive Homes, CONSUMER BANKR.
NEws, Aug. 12, 1999, at 1, 6 (noting that Senators Kohl and Sessions planned to offer an
amendment to S. 625, the Bankruptcy Reform Bill of 1999, capping the homestead exemption
at $100,000); Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1999, at A-20 (discussing bank-
ruptcy protection in Texas and Florida).
420. For example, a person contemplating bankruptcy may be able to disclaim an inheri-
tance the day before filing (assuming the disclaimer is otherwise within the state-prescribed
time limits), and that disclaimer would be recognized. However, if the same person gave away
assets she currently owned on that same day, those assets would be brought back into the
bankruptcy estate. See In re Atchison, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991)
(holding pre-bankruptcy filing disclaimer not a "transfer" and, therefore, not reachable by
bankruptcy trustee); but see In re Dinsdale, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 2279 (N.D. Iowa 1993) (holding
that pre-filing disclaimer was a "transfer" and, therefore, reachable by bankruptcy trustee).
421. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale UJ. 1, 4-7 (1996) (describing
judgement-proofimg strategies available to debtors and the decline of obstacles to the use of
those strategies).
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thrift trust, because the creditor can take protective action in advance,
overlooks the tort creditor, who cannot choose her tortfeasor. 2 In light of
the limited fraudulent conveyance actions and short statutes of limitations
included in the self-settled spendthrift trust statutes,4 23 existing contract
creditors also may not be sufficiently protected. For example, a creditor
existing at the time a debtor sets up an Alaska trust has to prove actual in-
tent to defraud, even if the creditor brings the action within the time frame
allowed. 424 Note also that with existing creditor-debtor relationships, the
papers have already been signed, and the creditor may not have the op-
portunity to include a provision protecting itself from the debtor's estab-
lishment of a self-settled spendthrift trust. Presumably contract creditors, at
least those who consult an attorney, will now include contract language to
protect against self-settled trusts, such as a call on the debt, making it due
in full upon the debtor's establishing a creditor-protected trust. However, it
is unclear whether any contract provisions would sufficiently protect the
creditor, since the creditor would still have to prove actual fraud once the
trust was established in order to collect from the trust assets.425 Thus, even
though the contract may have prohibited establishment of the trust, if the
debtor breaches and sets up the trust, he has improved his bargaining po-
sition (unless his assets outside of the trust are sufficient to satisfy the debt).
Also, self-settled trusts present additional, substantial problems for
creditors because there is an enormous difference, from the debtor's point
of view, in transferring assets to a self-settled trust rather than a third party.
The debtor would clearly prefer the self-settled trust because he retains the
use of the assets. That fact, in turn, affects the creditor because the creditor
can no longer rely on the debtor's self-interest in retaining use of his money
to restrict the debtor's willingness to make such a transfer. Also, as dis-
cussed above, the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the onshore trust
statutes give very thin protection to existing creditors. 26
The primary justification for self-settled spendthrift trusts is that they
are a response to the threat of excessive tort judgments. It seems a curious
response to the problem, however: Instead of responding directly to the
abuses and excesses of the tort system, the asset protection trust undercuts
the entire system of liability.42 7 As discussed below,4 28 the potential damage
422. See Emanuel, supra note 3, at 197-98 (discussing the difference between tort and
contract creditors).
423. Supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text (discussing the fraudulent conveyance
remedies in this context).
424. ALASKASTAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998).
425. Note that the other three states allowing onshore trusts recognize constructive fraud
as a ground of voiding a transfer, so the existing contract creditor would have a somewhat
easier time collecting in those states, as compared to Alaska. See supra note 164 and accompa-
nying text (describing those state fraudulent conveyance provisions).
426. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying tent (comparing fraudulent conveyance
provisions applicable to onshore trusts to general fraudulent conveyance provisions in other
states).
427. This approach resembles the family business arguments made in favor of repeal of
the estate tax. The argument is that the estate tax prevents families from passing the family
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to the liability system outweighs the benefit of relief from threat of abusive
use of the system.
C. THE POLICYARGUMENTS AGAINST SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
The policy arguments against self-settled spendthrift trusts essentially
fall into two categories: moral and economic. The moral argument is sim-
ple and intuitive: You should keep your promises and pay your debts be-
cause it is the right thing to do. According to this argument, there is
something disturbing about a country that would allow debtors to leave
their debts unpaid and still enjoy an extravagant lifestyle. Professor Gray's
and Professor Scott's objections seemed to fall on this moral plane,429 and
even Professor Costigan and Dean Griswold believed that the spendthrift
protection should be limited to reasonable support because amounts be-
yond that are inequitable. 30 These limits indicate policy decisions that
spendthrift protection is untenable in some circumstances. For example,
certain creditors-such as child support claimants-are generally exempted
from the effects of spendthrift dauses.431 Recognizing that spendthrift
protection should be limited to reasonable support needs of the benefici-
ary,4s2 some proposals and statutes set dollar limits on the amount subject
to spendthrift protection.4s3 For example, Dean Griswold proposed
authorizing spendthrift trusts, but allowing creditors to reach income in
excess of $5000 per year.4M Some states place statutory limits on the dollar
amount the trustor may place in such a trust435 and on annual income enti-
business down to the next generation. See Representative Christopher Cox's (R-Cal.) website
materials regarding repeal of the estate 'tax at <http:llcox.house.gov/deathtaxlindex.htm>
(visited May 4, 2000). This issue, even if you accept this problem as one that must be reme-
died, is not a complete justification for repeal of the entire tax, however, because the tax sys-
tem could be adjusted to facilitate such transfers without eliminating the entire tax. See I.R.C.
§§ 2032A, 2057, 6166 (West Supp. 1999) (providing provisions that give tax relief for closely-
held businesses and farms). One therefore suspects that the family business is just a poster
child for estate tax repeal.
428. See infra notes 442-49 and accompanying text (discussing the economic effects of the
self-settled spendthrift trust).
429. See GRAY, supra note 1, at iii (referring to the duty to pay one's debts); SCOTr, supra
note 5, § 156 (same).
430. GRIswOLD, supra note 24, § 565; Costigan, supra note 390, at 492.
431. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959) (identifying four classes of
claimants that can reach spendthrifted assets: child support and alimony claimants, providers
of necessary services, providers of services that protected the beneficiary's interest in the trust,
and the United States). At least 30 states have statutes that allow child support claimants to
reach assets in spendthrift trusts. William S. Huff, Spendthrift Clauses: Legality and Effect on Post-
Transfer Estate Planning, 1984 U. MIAMI PHILP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1206.3.
432. See Costigan, supra note 390, at 483-84 (noting that creditors have a legitimate griev-
ance when trusts provide beneficiaries with wealth and leave creditors unpaid).
433. See infra notes 436-38 and accompanying text (referring to the statutes).
434. GRISWOLD, supra note 24, § 565, at 648. His proposal also expressly excluded self-
settled spendthrift trusts and allowed a court to order payment of claims for alimony, child
support, provision of necessaries, or injury in tort from assets otherwise protected by a
spendthrift provision. Id.
435. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15306.5 (West 1991) (allowing up to 25% of payments to or
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tied to protection.436 Two states statutorily allow tort daimants to access
spendthrift trusts.4s Trust ceilings and exceptions for certain creditors in-
dicate that the policy arguments supporting spendthrift trusts can yield to
deserving, competing interests and also indicate that those policy argu-
ments have natural limits. Most negative reactions to the concept of self-
settled spendthrift trusts are probably due to an instinctive reaction that
they are somehow unfair. Most of us have been played the role of both
debtor and creditor and can look at this somewhat objectively. My guess is
that most of us would have the same feeling as to the morally "right" side of
this issue. However, Professor Costigan questions why we should favor
creditor rights over debtor rights. While, overall, the fair and just solu-
tion is to hold debtors responsible for their debts, there are certainly abuses
by unscrupulous creditors.439
The second category of arguments against self-settled spendthrift
trusts turns on an economic analysis of their impact. Professor Hirsch ar-
gues that morality should not enter the debate, in part because extending
credit is a business, and both parties have to be aware of the underlying
legal structure defining the relationship.440 He also argues that the efficacy
of spendthrift trusts is not an issue that stirs us like racial discrimination." 1
When the issue is more technical, and does not have the urgency of "fun-
damental ideals of human dignity," then Hirsch believes economic analysis
is the more appropriate evaluating tool.442
Evaluating the economic impact of self-settled spendthrift trusts would
be a daunting and very speculative task that is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. However, there is one economic impact that is perhaps the most sig-
nificant objection to the self-settled spendthrift trust. Professor Lynn Lo-
Pucki has warned that the increasing ability to avoid liability threatens the
system of civil enforcement of obligations, both tort and contract.4 3 Profes-
sor LoPucki analogizes to a poker game where the players no longer have
to ante up any chips. 4" While the broader concerns about undermining
liability go to the asset protection methods available to large business enti-
for the benefit of a beneficiary to be subject to creditor claims in spite of spendthrift protec-
tion); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(B) (Lexis Supp. 1999) (limiting amount sheltered in spendthrift
trusts to $1 million).
436. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.25 (West. Supp. 2000) (allowing income payable to
beneficiary in excess of $25,000 a year to be subject to creditors claims).
437. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c) (1999) (allowing tort creditors, tax and other gov-
ernmental claimants, child support and alimony claimants, and providers of necessities to
access spendthrift trust assets); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1923(3) (West 1999) (mirroring Dean
Griswold's sample statute).
438. Costigan, supra note 390, at 492.
439. Such abuses have, to some extent, been addressed legislatively, with consumer credit
legislation and the bankruptcy laws.
440. See Hirsch, supra note 397, at 60-61 (acknowledging that the rights of involuntary
creditors "take on a moral tone").
441. Hirsch, supra note 397, at 94.
442. Id.
443. See LoPucki, supra note 421, at 3-4.
444. Id. at 3.
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ties, extending asset-protection to individuals seriously increases the risk of
undermining the only way, other than criminal liability, that our system of
civil liability enforces its rules of individual responsibility.
Whether the impact of self-settled trusts on the tort system is desirable,
therefore, depends on the view of the efficiency of the tort system. In broad
terms, commentators usually identify the primary purposes of the tort sys-
tem as deterrence, compensation, resource allocation, and fairness, but they
have also argued that the tort system should be replaced because its costs
outweigh its benefits.4 5 However, even those who would eliminate the tort
system would address the problem directly by system-wide abolition and
acknowledge that the deterrence and compensation functions would have
to be replaced by other methods.446 Assuming one agrees with the tort sys-
tem's detractors, the self-settled spendthrift trust seems an inappropriate
response, since it does not replace the functions of the tort system in cases
where the tortfeasor has used the self-settled trust to avoid liability, and
because it provides relief only to tortfeasors who have the means and the
sophistication to avail themselves of trust protection.
After one weighs all of the policy concerns on both sides of the argu-
ment, two competing concerns must be balanced. While many of these con-
cerns, such as treating the self-made millionaire on a par with the trust
fund baby, are primarily only interesting in academic debate,447 the two
issues of major concern that do actually capture the attention of the public
at large are the threat of inflated tort judgments versus the unfairness of
allowing some people (who are sufficiently well-off to hire lawyers and set
up asset-protection trusts) to enjoy a prosperous lifestyle without having to
pay their bills. On the second issue, the policymakers should be concerned
not just with public outrage over the unfairness of allowing some debtors to
avoid their debts, but with the overall effect these trusts may have on civil
liability as an enforcement system. It seems an odd legislative choice to cure
the first concern, not by directly reforming that system, but by giving a free
pass to debtors from all debts, justified or not.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The success of the self-settled trust is currently quite uncertain. For
some trustors, it will be enough of a deterrent to creditors to ensure quick
settlements of any disputes. With the right sympathetic creditor and an
egregious set of facts, a creditor may gain access. The question of whether
the tax advantages will be realized will probably depend on how popular
the device becomes. If the trust is infrequently used, the IRS may allow tax-
payers to claim the estate freeze benefits without challenge. If it becomes a
445. See generay WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW (1987) (same); STEVEN SHAVELi, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)
(same); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tart Law, 73 CAL. L REV. 555 (1985) (discuss-
ing the primary purposes of the tort system).
446. See Sugarman, supra note 445, at 661-64 (proposing alternatives).
447. Hirsch, supra note 397, at 95.
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popular freeze device, then history indicates that it will likely become a
target of the IRS, and there are several avenues for the government to use
in attacking it, from individual audits and litigation -to legislation directly
eliminating the tax benefit.448 The more troubling question is why state
legislators view this device as reflecting a policy that is sufficiently justifiable
to be the law. Why would the government approve an open-ended permis-
sion to leave bills unpaid? In doing so, state governments show that they
are willing to help their banks provide the latest version of the free toaster,
even though the benefit to local banks will lessen as more states, closer to
home, enact similar legislation. If these trusts stay within the realm of the
very rich, with only the occasional shocking tale of injustice, then they may
be more easily tolerated. On the other hand, they may be yet another sign
that paying one's bills is becoming a "moth-eaten virtue."449
APPENDIX-PERTINENT ALASKA STATUTES GOVERNING SELF-SETTLED
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
AS § 13.12.205. Decedent's nonprobate transfers to others
The value of the augmented estate includes the value of the decedent's
nonprobate transfers to others, not included under AS 13.12.204, of any of
the following types, in the amount provided respectively for each type of
transfeil:
(1) property owned or owned in substance by the decedent im-
mediately before death that passed outside probate at the dece-
dent's death; property included under this category consists of
(A) property over which the decedent alone, immedi-
ately before death, held a presently exercisable general
power of appointment; the amount included is the value
of the property subject to the power, to the extent the
property passed at the decedent's death, by exercise,
release, lapse, default, or otherwise, to or for the benefit
of a person other than the decedent's estate or surviving
spouse;
(B) the decedent's fractional interest in property held
by the decedent in joint tenancy with the right of survi-
vorship; the amount included is the value of the dece-
dent's fractional interest, to the extent that the frac-
tional interest passed by right of survivorship at the de-
448. For example, when the classic freeze technique (with a closely held company, parents
gave common stock-representing future appreciation-to children and retained preferred
stock, thus giving them an income stream) became too popular, Congress responded by en-
acting section 2036(c) (now repealed) that eliminated the advantages of such techniques. E.
James Gamble, Section 2036(c)-A Statutory Analysis, 23 U. OF MIAM i PHILLIP E. HECKERLING
INST. ON EST. PLAN. 13-1, 13-3-4 (1989).
449. Dobris, supra note 416, at 562-63.
1262 [2000]
GRAYS GHOST
cedent's death to a surviving joint tenant other than the
decedent's surviving spouse;
(C) the decedent's ownership interest in property or
accounts held in pay on death, transfer on death, or co-
ownership registration with the right of survivorship;
the amount included is the value of the decedent's own-
ership interest, to the extent the decedent's ownership
interest passed at the decedent's death to or for the
benefit of a person other than the decedent's estate or
surviving spouse;
(D) proceeds of insurance, including accidental death
benefits, on the life of the decedent, if the decedent
owned the insurance policy immediately before death or
if and to the extent the decedent alone and immediately
before death held a presently exercisable general power
of appointment over the policy or its proceeds; the
amount included is the value of the proceeds, to the
extent the proceeds were payable at the decedent's
death to or for the benefit of a person other than the
decedent's estate or surviving spouse;
(2) property transferred in any of the following forms by the de-
cedent during marriage:
(A) an irrevocable transfer, including an irrevocable
transfer in trust with a transfer restriction under AS
34.40.110(a), in which the decedent retained the right
to the possession or enjoyment of, or to the income
from, the property, if and to the extent the decedent's
right terminated at or continued beyond the decedent's
death; the amount included is the value of the fraction
of the property to which the decedent's right related, to
the extent the fraction of the property passed outside
probate to or for the benefit of a person other than the
decedent's estate or surviving spouse;
(B) a transfer in which the decedent created a power
over the income or property, exercisable by the dece-
dent alone or in conjunction with another person, or
exercisable by a nonadverse party, to or for the benefit
of the decedent, the decedent's creditors, the decedent's
estate, or creditors of the decedent's estate; the amount
included with respect to a power over property is the
value of the property subject to the power, and the
amount included with respect to a power over income is
the value of the property that produces or produced the
income, to the extent the power in either case was exer-
cisable at the decedent's death to or for the benefit of a
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person other than the decedent's surviving spouse or to
the extent the property passed at the decedent's death,
by exercise, release, lapse, default, or otherwise, to or
for the benefit of a person other than the decedent's
estate or surViving spouse; if the power is a power over
both income and property and the preceding provision
defining the amount included produces different
amounts, the amount included is the greater amount;
and
(3) property that passed during marriage and during the two-
year period next preceding the decedent's death as a result of a
transfer by the decedent if the transfer was of any of the following
types:
(A) property that passed as a result of the termination
of a right or interest in, or power over, property that
would have been included in the augmented estate un-
der (1)(A), (B), or (C) or (2) of this section, if the right,
interest, or power had not terminated until the dece-
dent's death; the amount included is the value of the
property that would have been included under (1)(A),
(B), or (C) or (2) of this section, if the property were
valued at the time the right, interest, or power termi-
nated, and is included only to the extent the property
passed upon termination to or for the benefit of a per-
son other than the decedent or the decedent's estate,
spouse, or surviving spouse; as used in this subpara-
graph, termination, with respect to a right or interest in
property, occurs when the right or interest terminated
by the terms of the governing instrument or the dece-
dent transferred or relinquished the right or interest,
and, with respect to a power over property, occurs when
the power terminated by exercise, release, lapse, de-
fault, or otherwise, but, with respect to a power de-
scribed in (1)(A) of this section, termination occurs
when the power terminated by exercise or release, but
not otherwise;
(B) a transfer of or relating to an insurance policy on
the life of the decedent if the proceeds would have been
included in the augmented estate under (l)(D) of this
section had the transfer not occurred; the amount in-
cluded is the value of the insurance proceeds to the ex-
tent the proceeds were payable at the decedent's death
to or for the benefit of a person other than the dece-
dent's estate or surviving spouse;
(C) a transfer of property, to the extent not otherwise
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included in the augmented estate, made to or for the
benefit of a person other than the decedent's surviving
spouse; the amount included is the value of the prop-
erty transferred to a person to the extent that the ag-
gregate transfers to that person in either of the two
years exceeded $10,000.
AS § 13.36.035. Court jurisdiction; choice of law
(a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated
by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts, in-
cluding trusts covered by (c) of this section. Except as provided in
(c) and (d) of this section, proceedings that may be maintained
under this section are those concerning the administration and
distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determi-
nation of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries of
trusts. These include proceedings to
(1) appoint or remove a trustee;
(2) review trustees' fees and to review and settle interim
or final accounts;
(3) ascertain beneficiaries, determine any question
arising in the administration or distribution of any trust
including questions of construction of trust instruments,
instruct trustees, and determine the existence or non-
existence of any immunity, power, privilege, duty, or
right; and
(4) release registration of a trust.
(b) Neither registration of a trust nor a proceeding under this
section results in continuing supervisory proceedings. The man-
agement and distribution of a trust estate, submission of accounts
and reports to beneficiaries, payment of trustee's fees and other
obligations of a trust, acceptance and change of trusteeship, and
other aspects of the administration of a trust shall proceed expe-
ditiously consistently with the terms of the trust, free of judicial
intervention and without order, approval or other action of any
court, subject to the jurisdiction of the court as invoked by inter-
ested parties or as otherwise exercised as provided by law.
(c) A provision that the laws of this state govern the validity, con-
struction, and administration of the trust and that the trust is
subject to the jurisdiction of this state is valid,.effective, and con-
clusive for the trust if
(1) some or all of the trust assets are deposited in this
state and are being administered by a qualified person;
in this paragraph, "deposited in this state" includes be-
ing held in a checking account, time deposit, certificate
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of deposit, brokerage account, trust company fiduciary
account, or other similar account or deposit that is lo-
cated in this state;
(2) a trustee is a qualified person who is designated as a
trustee under the governing instrument or by a court
having jurisdiction over the trust;
(3) the powers of the trustee identified under (2) of this
subsection include or are limited to
(A) maintaining records for the trust on an
exclusive basis or a nonexclusive basis; and
(B) preparing or arranging for the prepara-
tion of, on an exclusive basis or a nonexclusive
basis, an income tax return that must be filed
by the trust; and
(4) part or all of the administration occurs in this state,
including physically maintaining trust records in this
state.
(d) The validity, construction, and administration of a trust with a
state jurisdiction provision are determined by the laws of this
state, including the
(1) capacity of the settlor;
(2) powers, obligations, liabilities, and rights of the
trustees and the appointment and removal of the trus-
tees; and
(3) existence and extent of powers, conferred or re-
tained, including a trustee's discretionary powers, the
powers retained by a beneficiary of the trust, and the
validity of the exercise of a power.
AS § 13.36.390. Definitions
In this chapter,
(1) "qualified person" means
(A) an individual who, except for brief intervals, mili-
tary service, attendance at an educational or training in-
stitution, or for absences for good cause shown, resides
in this state, whose true and permanent home is in this
state, who does not have a present intention of moving
from this state, and who has the intention of returning
to this state when away;
(B) a trust company that is organized under AS 06.25
and that has its principal place of business in this state;
or
(C) a bank that is organized under AS 06.05, or a na-"
tional banking association that is organized under 12
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U.S.C. 21-216d, if the bank or national banking asso-
ciation possesses and exercises trust powers and has its
principal place of business in this state;
(2) "settlor" means a person who transfers property in trust and
includes a person who furnishes the property transferred to a
trust even if the trust is created by another person.
(3) "state jurisdiction provision" means a provision that the laws
of this state govern the validity, construction, and administration
of a trust and that the trust is subject to the jurisdiction of this
state.
AS § 34A0.010. Invalidity generally
Except as provided in AS 34.40.110, a conveyance or assignment, in writing
or otherwise, of an estate or interest in land, or in goods, or things in ac-
tion, or of rents or profits issuing from them or a charge upon land, goods,
or things in action, or upon the rents or profits from them, made with the
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful
suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence
of debt given, action commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the
like intent, as against the persons so hindered, delayed, or defrauded is
void.
AS § 34.40.110. Restricting transfers of trust interests
(a) A person who in writing transfers property in trust may pro-
vide that the interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be ei-
ther voluntarily or involuntarily transferred before payment or
delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee. In this
subsection,
(1) "property" includes real property, personal prop-
erty, and interests in real or personal property;
(2) "transfer" means any form of transfer, including
deed, conveyance, or assignment.
(b) If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of
this section, the transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing
when the trust is created, a person who subsequently becomes a
creditor, or another person from satisfying a claim out of the
beneficiary's interest in the trust, unless the
(1) transfer was intended in whole or in part to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors or other persons under AS
34.40.010;
(2) trust provides that the settlor may revoke or termi-
nate all or part of the trust without the consent of a per-
son who has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust
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and the interest would be adversely affected by the ex-
ercise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or ter- -
minate all or part of the trust; in this paragraph, "re-
voke or terminate" does not include a power to veto a
distribution from the trust, a testamentary special power
of appointment or similar power, or the right to receive
a distribution of income, corpus, or both in the discre-
tion of a person, including a trustee, other than the set-
tlor;
(3) trust requires that all or a part of the trust's income
or principal, or both, must be distributed to the settlor;
or
(4) at the time of the transfer, the settlor is in default by
30 or more days of making a payment due under a
child support judgment or order.
(c) The satisfaction of a claim under (b)(1)-(4) of this section is
limited to that part of the trust to which (b)(1)-(4) of this section
applies.
(d) A cause of action or claim for relief with respect to a fraudu-
lent transfer under (b)(1) of this section, or under other law, is
extinguished unless the action is brought as to a person who
(1) is a creditor when the trust is created, within the
later of
(A) four years after the transfer is made; or
(B) one year after the transfer is or reasona-
bly could have been discovered by the person;
or
(2) becomes a creditor subsequent to the tramsfer into
trust, within four years after the transfer is made.
(e) If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of
this section, the transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing
when the trust is created, a person who subsequently becomes a
creditor, or another person from asserting any cause of action or
claim for relief against a trustee of the trust or against others in-
volved in the preparation or funding of the trust for conspiracy to
commit fraudulent conveyance, aiding and abetting a fraudulent
conveyance, or participation in the trust transaction. The creditor
and other person prevented from asserting a cause of action or
claim for relief is limited to recourse against the trust assets and
the settlor to the extent allowed under AS 34.40.010.
(f) In this section, "settlor" means a person who transfers real
property, personal property, or an interest in real or personal
property, in trust.
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